

CONFERENCE

SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

September 25 - 26, 1972

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DATE 9/10/79 BY 6076 WOH/RS

POSITION PAPER
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSION

May 19, 1972

OVERVIEW

This paper deals with the conduct by the FBI of intelligence-type investigations supervised by the Domestic Intelligence Division. Authority for these investigations is documented and outlined, including situations where there is no direct violation of law. Criteria and controls and dissemination policies implementing this authority are detailed. Recommendations are made for studies in several areas where security operations may benefit.

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9/20/72

PERSONNEL CHANGES

INSPECTION DIVISION

1st Choice	-	X Leonard M. Walters	u
2nd Choice	-	Karl L. Brouse	
3rd Choice	-	Robert E. Gebhardt	

IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

1st Choice	-	Karl L. Brouse	u
2nd Choice	-	X Robert E. Gebhardt	
3rd Choice	-	Wason G. Campbell	

NEW YORK

1st Choice	-	X Andrew J. Decker (#4)	u
2nd Choice	-	[Redacted] (#5)	
3rd Choice	-	Charles D. Brennan (#4)	X

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EL PASO

1st Choice	-	[Redacted]	u
2nd Choice	-		
3rd Choice	-		

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b7C

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

1st Choice	-	X John J. McDermott	u
2nd Choice	-	Donald E. Moore (DID)	
3rd Choice	-	Joseph D. Purvis	

ALEXANDRIA

1st Choice	-	X Charles D. Brennan	u
2nd Choice	-	X Jay Cochran, Jr.	
3rd Choice	-	Marlin H. Moore	

ST. LOUIS

1st Choice	-	X Robert G. Kunkel	
2nd Choice	-	Jay Cochran, Jr.	
3rd Choice	-	[Redacted]	

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ORGANIZED CRIME SECTION

1st Choice	-	[Redacted]	
2nd Choice	-		
3rd Choice	-		

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b7C

SAN FRANCISCO

*Revised made 9/20/72
4:10 to 5:10 P*

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3-45 (Rev. 10-24-72)

Admin. Changes file
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

, 1972

Director's Office	Mr. D.J. Brennan, Jr. B-110
Mr. Felt, 5744	Mr. Gregory, B-110
Mr. Baker, 5734	Mr. Feeney, 4519
Mr. Bishop, 5634	Mr. J. Cox, 3230 IB
Mr. Callahan, 5525	Mr. Roderick, 3117 IB
Mr. Cleveland, 1742	Mr. Day, 912 9&D
Mr. Conrad, 7621	Mr. Dunphy, 331 OPO
Mr. Dalbey, 5642	Mr. Fisher, 7541
Mr. Gebhardt, 5706	Mr. Healy, 4704
Mr. Jenkins, 5234	Mr. Jackson, 5509
Mr. Marshall, 7746	Mr. Price, 2264
Mr. Miller, 1026 9&D	Mr. McDonough, 2260
Mr. Purvis, 4130 IB	Mr. McMichael, 5266
Mr. Soyars, 3114 IB	Mr. Perritte, 808 OPO
Mr. Walters, 5256	Mr. Quinn, 4258
Mr. Walsh, 5525	Mr. Row, 6221 IB
Mr. Donahoe, 5734	Mr. Suttler, 4248
Mr. O'Connell, 5519	Mr. Tullai, Quantico
Mr. Kinley, 5633	Mr. Beckner, 1521
Mrs. Neenan, 5633	Mrs. A. Smith, 5302
Miss Smith, 5744	Mr. Haisten, 4732
Conveyer Sta., 1213 IB	Mrs. Lockhart, 5263
Mall Room, 5531	Mrs. Sisk, 3137 IB
Messenger Room, 7529	Mrs. Smith, 914 9&D
Call Me, Please	Mr. Marsden
See Me, Please	Mr. Atwell
	Mr. Codi
	Mr. Schweitzer

M

Room


*"Re-establishment of Liaison Section
as a channel for discussion of operational
& policy problems arising with other
Federal agencies"*

MECHANICAL SECTION

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*Central Material
Attached*



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

November 22, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

19-72

Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Baker	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Cleveland	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Deibey	_____
Mr. Gebhardt	_____
Mr. Jenkins	_____
Mr. Marshall	_____
Mr. Miller, E.S.	_____
Mr. Parnell	_____
Mr. Severs	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Kinley	_____
Mr. Armstrong	_____
Ms. Herwig	_____
Mrs. Neenan	_____

MEMORANDUM TO ALL BUREAU OFFICIALS AND SUPERVISORS

(A) LIAISON SECTION -- The Liaison Section has been reconstituted effective November 13, 1972, with its front office in Room 1010 9&D in the Domestic Intelligence Division. It is intended that the section service all divisions of the Bureau and provide a channel for the discussion of operational or policy problems which may arise with major agencies of the Executive Branch of Government.

The section is being initially staffed by five domestic Liaison Supervisors who, while continuing liaison with The White House, will reestablish contacts at all levels within the Departments of Defense, State, Transportation and Treasury and with the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Problems which arise with these agencies may be referred to the Liaison Section for handling and resolution. In addition, should problems arise with agencies not listed, the section will, on request, endeavor to make whatever contact is necessary.

Reestablishment of the Liaison Section is not intended to interfere in any way with present liaison arrangements being handled elsewhere. For example, the Criminal Section has established effective operational contact with the Federal Aviation Agency in connection with hijackings and with the Secret Service in connection with threats against the President. Similarly, the Fugitive Section has established effective contact with the Headquarters of the Selective Service System. Such contacts should continue; however, in order that the new section may be aware of existing arrangements, notification of any continuing contact with other Executive Branch agencies should be promptly furnished by routing slip or informal memorandum to the Liaison Section.

11-22-72
MEMORANDUM 19-72

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Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Contingency Plans for
Handling Terrorist Attacks

It is not the object of this memorandum to find fault nor to point a finger of criticism or accusation of short sightedness at anyone. Under normal conditions the Chicago Office undoubtedly would have been able to handle a situation requiring body armor, mobile radios, shotguns and the like, usually involving a limited number of Agents and subjects. However, these are not normal times. We are in an age of terrorism. A potential attack of the sort which occurred at Lod Airport or which occurred at the time of the Munich massacre could happen in the U.S. The tactic of the urban guerrilla, often used in Latin America, Algeria, the Middle East and elsewhere in the world, was introduced into the U.S. about five years ago and we have seen ample evidence of it in the form of ambushed police officers and terrorist bombings which have included the U.S. Capitol and the Pentagon. We now accept the existence of urban guerrilla terrorism and the fact that the urban guerrilla's philosophy of terrorism has made it necessary for law enforcement to adopt new standards and adapt to the constant threat of terrorist attack. We recognize that FBI personnel have been targeted for assault or assassination. (u)

The President, in setting up the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, took note of the fact that political terrorism, which has spread to all parts of the globe, could spread to the U.S. Terrorist acts have occurred in Latin America and in Canada, and only a fortunate combination of excellent work by the FBI and circumstances has kept major terrorist attacks from occurring here the past few months. In reviewing the facts we must realize that with our open borders and ease of entry into the U.S. terrorists can strike without our advance knowledge. (u)

The FBI has been designated by the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism to assume jurisdiction and responsibility in the event of a terrorist attack in the U.S. The FBI has developed contingency plans at Headquarters and in every field office for the

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Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Contingency Plans for
Handling Terrorist Attacks

purpose of instant response in the event of a terrorist attack. And while the FBI will not launch a military-type offensive or action against an entrenched terrorist seizure, the FBI will be in complete charge of operations involving confrontations with armed terrorists. There may be time for consultation with local police or even the military services but, as in the case at Chicago, time may not permit or other circumstances may dictate that only the FBI should respond initially. In any event by desire of the President and by legislative enactment, the FBI has the primary responsibility and, therefore, should assure that it is fully prepared to carry out such responsibilities. (u)

It is true that arrangements have been perfected to secure certain types of equipment from the Defense Department in case of a terrorist attack. However, such procedures are time-consuming and under the best possible conditions it would be a matter of hours before military equipment could be delivered to us. Some equipment in hands of local law enforcement might conceivably be available on a loan basis. But in translating need and availability into time, there will be delay between point of need and actual availability to our Agents. (u)

What we are thinking of now in terms of equipment are the items referred to by Chicago such as body armor; mobile (personal size) radio equipment; shotguns; gas equipment, including modern gas masks; binoculars; bullhorns; and perhaps some miscellaneous other small items. Chicago's recommended use of self-contained squad cars does not appear to be practical and the recommended use of helmets, identifying vests and arm bands may have only limited value. However, equipment which may be needed on a minute's notice should be available in a field office vault for immediate use. (u)

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Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Contingency Plans for
Handling Terrorist Attacks

Chicago has recommended acquisition of additional equipment specifically for use in responding to terrorist-type attacks or situations. Undoubtedly, similar needs exist in many other field offices. This is the purpose of the attached airtel to all offices. The Chicago critique may serve to graphically illustrate the implementation of a contingency plan, only to find that critical equipment is not available. (u)

In setting up the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, the President issued instructions that additional costs necessary in the setting up of antiterrorist plans should be brought before the Office of Management and Budget. It would appear that equipment needs of the FBI to prepare to meet the terrorist thrust would fall within the framework of the foregoing Presidential instructions. It is believed, however, based on preliminary contacts with the military, that numerous items of equipment, including many of those mentioned herein, may be stockpiled in military arsenals and available for transfer without cost to the FBI. This is particularly true with respect to items which were stockpiled for the war in Indochina and which may now be considered surplus. At any rate, before consideration is given to submission of a supplemental budget request, we should exhaust all possibilities of a transfer of equipment without cost to the FBI from the military. (u)

A recent study with regard to up-to-date equipment, such as the latest kind of body armor, revealed that a radically new body armor is now being tested by the Army but will not be available until at least April, 1973, and would probably not be available except by purchase. However, other types of body armor may be available in stockpiles. (u)

We recommend that the attached airtel to all field offices be sent for the purpose of canvassing the field for equipment needs.

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Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Contingency Plans for
Handling Terrorist Attacks

Once we get a reply it is our thought that General Investigative Division and Domestic Intelligence Division meet with representatives of the Laboratory Division and Training Division to arrive at an intelligent overall estimate of our needs. Thereafter, we can approach the Defense Department about transferring a specific amount of equipment to the FBI without cost. If this proves to be unsuccessful, then we should submit a supplemental budget as instructed by the President in his charge to the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. (u)(4)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) That the attached airtel to all offices be approved and sent. (u)

2) That upon receipt of canvass of the field, representatives of General Investigative, Laboratory, Training, and Domestic Intelligence Divisions meet to decide what equipment is essential to our needs. (u)

3) After determining equipment needs, approach the Defense Department for possible transfer of needed equipment to FBI. (u)

Agree with survey to
determine extent of any additional
stockpiling considered warranted
DSC

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F B I

Transmit in _____ Via _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Airtel

(Priority)

To: All SACs

Date 1/9/73

From: Acting Director, FBI

CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR
HANDLING TERRORIST ATTACKS
BUDED: 1/22/73

(U) As result of information furnished by a source indicating that Arab terrorists residing in the Chicago area were planning a terrorist action similar to the massacre which occurred at Lod Airport, Israel, 5/30/72, Chicago instituted an emergency plan on 11/24/72 which was a modification of their sky-jacking plan designed to cope with a terrorist attack. The information was such to suggest that one or other of the two major airports in Chicago could be the possible target for terrorist action. (U)

No attack took place; however, implementation of plan by Chicago provided an excellent field test for evaluating our emergency procedures for dealing with threatened terrorist attacks. Simultaneously, areas of specific need were highlighted, particularly with regard to equipment. (U)

A copy of a critique prepared by the Chicago Office shortly after the exercise is attached for the benefit of each office. Problems experienced by Chicago could well be experienced by any of the field offices under similar conditions. (U)

The stress placed on equipment needs in this critique is in line with preliminary studies underway at the Bureau to determine the type and quality of equipment required to cope with terrorist-type situations. In connection with these studies, a fieldwide estimate of requirements is necessary. Therefore, each office should carefully study attached critique and, based on the applicability

Enclosure

(Do not type below this line.)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-09-2009

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CLASS. & EXT. BY 9/10/79
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 1/9/93

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Airtel to All SACs
Re: Contingency Plans for
Handling Terrorist Attacks
Buded: 1/22/73

in each instance, submit to the Bureau an estimate of the type and quantity of equipment it would need to respond to a possible terrorist attack. These estimates should be carefully considered and reasonable and should be fully justifiable in terms of the conditions peculiar to each office. The planned use for additional equipment recommended should be set out in detail. (u)

Suairtel to reach Bureau, Attention: Research Section, Domestic Intelligence Division, by close of business 1/22/73. (u)

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ACTION IN CHICAGO IS NOT
TO BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE THE BUREAU. (u)

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T. J. Jenkins to Mr. Felt Memo

Re: Summary of Accomplishments, Training Division, Calendar Year 1972

New Management Seminars for FBI Personnel

An innovative program devised to provide advanced managerial training to FBI personnel in leadership positions was developed. Under this training program, three highly advanced seminars were held at FBIHQ on 8/28/72, 9/11/72, and 9/25/72 for a total of 63 Special Agents in Charge. The first executive development seminar was held 12/4/72 at the new FBI Academy and was attended by 20 Assistant Special Agents in Charge. Another management seminar designed for field and FBI HQ Supervisors was held 11/27/72 with 38 supervisors in attendance. (u)

Language and Stenographic Training

During the period covered by this report, 47 Special Agents graduated from Language School and were made available to the field. As 1973 began, 38 Agents were undergoing this training, most of which is provided by the Defense Language Institute and at no cost to the Bureau. Employees afforded training in stenographic procedures numbered 131 and a total of 79 were provided shorthand instruction. (u)

FBI Law Enforcement Training Advisory Committee

In 1972, a newly formed 12-member FBI Law Enforcement Training Advisory Committee convened on two occasions (August and December) to evaluate law enforcement education and training offered at the Academy, as well as field police training activities, to insure that these programs were responsive to the current needs of the law enforcement community. The Committee, composed of five prominent law enforcement officials, four leading educators, and three top businessmen, considered a number of matters bearing on our role and future directions in police training and education. At their final December meeting, the Committee submitted a preliminary draft of their findings and recommendations to Acting Associate Director Felt with a final report to be submitted in the near future. (u)

National Bomb Data Center

In June, 1972, at the request of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, operations of the National Bomb Data Center were transferred from the International Association of Chiefs of Police to the Bureau. Since the transfer, the Center's mailing list has been refined and extensive informational and training data regarding bombing matters have been disseminated. (u)

Suggestion Program; Commendations and Incentive Awards

During 1972, Bureau employees submitted a total of 1,017 suggestions, an increase of 93 over the previous year. Of these, 312 were adopted with 29 still awaiting resolution. A total of 18 incentive awards, involving 19 employees, were made for a total of \$5,235. Through the Suggestion Program, an estimated first-year saving of \$191,833.01 was attained. During the year, personnel in the Training Division received 15 incentive awards and 31 letters of commendation. (u)

RECOMMENDATION:

27 9:45 P

None. For information. 3 -

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

ADDRESS OF THE HON. L. PATRICK GRAY, III,
ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, BEFORE THE NATIONAL SYMPO-
SIUM ON TERRORISM, FBI ACADEMY, QUANTICO,
VIRGINIA, JANUARY 16, 1973

I just had a little joke this morning with one of my Assistant Directors. At least I thought it was a joke, maybe he doesn't. But I said to him, "Those remarks that were prepared for me to deliver this morning (to you gentlemen) caused me a little excitement last night when I began to read them because they were sheer Pabulum and if I had uttered any words like that, the FBI and I would be hooted out of the law enforcement profession."

I want to take a little bit of time with you this morning. I think the first thing I want to say to you is that long before I became a member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and perhaps because of the era in which I grew up, I had a profound respect for the police officer and his position in the community. It seemed to me that most of us growing up in that particular era had a similar respect. Today, high among my concerns, very high among my concerns, second only to assaults on Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are assaults upon the

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police officers of the United States. Each and every police killing in the United States comes across my desk in detail because I have asked for it. And I am intimately concerned that we in the law enforcement profession don't seem to be able to cope with this for one reason or another. True, only 126 police officers were killed in 1971, and only 112 were killed in 1972, but that's too many. One is too many.

Maybe I'm unrealistic; maybe I'm idealistic. But I am analyzing each and every one of these situations that come across my desk in detail, and I think the police departments in the United States are making some mistakes, grievous mistakes.

And who am I, a novice, to stand up here and talk to you in this vein? Well, maybe a fresh look is needed. Maybe the detailed look that I am taking is needed. But I find that officers are not using NCIC. I find that in some departments there are not instructions to utilize NCIC. I find state highway patrolmen going up on automobiles-- on lonely roads, against four people--without calling for help. The officer being shot from a range of 18 inches. Two shots in his chest.

What's so damned important about stopping an automobile with four unknown thugs in it before you call in some people to help you check? One fine state highway

patrolman dead. I could go on. Police officers in cities-- I read these things--walking into banks after bank alarms have been triggered, alone, weapon not unholstered, and they're shot standing up from 18 to 24 inches. Two, three shots right in their chests--dead.

I think we've got some work to do in the law enforcement profession. I think that NCIC can be a big help. I find in certain cases that instructions have been issued in a department for an officer to utilize NCIC but he doesn't do it. And he lies dead as a result. This has happened. In today's clime I think it's really imperative and mandatory that those exercising leadership and command in police departments, in state police organizations, highway patrol organizations, get tough and be tough with our own to help them save their own lives while doing their duty.

The recent situation in New Orleans just happened to be the recent situation. More have preceded it, as you all know. But I sat down and with almost tears in my eyes wrote a personal, handwritten note to the superintendent because I grieved so at the loss of those valiant officers. And I'm going to say here and now within the family that I don't think that they needed to die had we been prepared to meet this kind of an attack.

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What are the real factors in this so-called new thing terrorism?--and it's not a new thing at all. I think the first factor that I would like to touch upon with you and hope that you carry back with you to your community is society at large, our fellow citizens. Educate them. It's not easy--but educate them!

The terrorist scene is not a Roman Colosseum; and my advice to the community is "Stay at home my fellow citizens! The terrorist is an outlaw, a wild animal, a jungle animal, a jungle killer! Stay at home, my fellow citizens. How that terrorist got that way is not important. We're not interested in the psychological, philosophical, sociological factors on the terrorist scene. How he got that way is not important to us. At least it's not important to us at the time he's doing his thing on the terrorist scene. Stopping him is very important to you, my fellow citizen; very important to you, my fellow citizen; or he will kill you, and many other innocents, as he did in New Orleans, and as he will do again.

"Stay at home, my fellow citizens. Insist, my fellow citizen, that the media not glorify the terrorist and ridicule those of us who are laying our lives on the line and trying to keep the terrorist from killing you. We may make our

mistakes, but we are there in the caldron alone where the lead and the bombs are flying. And we are there because it is our duty to you to keep the terrorist from killing you. No one else holds that duty to you, my fellow citizen, only we, your police, have that duty. Not the critics, not the columnists, not the television commentators, not the handwringers, just us---your police. We have that duty to you."

So, I say to you law enforcement officers that a part of this total pattern involves police-community relations and it involves the ability of the police department to educate our fellow citizens. You can say this cannot be done, and perhaps there are some who would agree with you in today's clime. I will not agree with you because I think you've got to fight, crawl and scratch all the way up against any adversity to educate that fellow citizen. I can tell you how they hamper us in hijackings when they crowd the airport. Those who recently encountered terrorism in New Orleans among our profession can tell you perhaps how our fellow citizens hampered them.

The second factor I want to talk to you about is police intelligence before and after the fact. Certainly you may have already heard enough of this, but as I size up the picture and as I look at the contingency planning

it seems to me that it is imperative that we get it before the fact if we can and be ready. Get it during the terrorist action if you can and use it to your advantage. Get it after the fact if you can and use it for training.

Another factor tied in with the intelligence, of course, is police training in the assault. We normally are not trained for this sort of thing. But we have seen the developing events and we have not seen anyone else step into the breach. It's still us, so therefore we have to be trained in the assault.

The first thing that comes to mind there certainly, at least it does to me, is the physical condition of the officer. You simply cannot take on some of these young punks today, nor can you engage in assault situations unless the police officer is in good physical condition. I have recently taken steps in the FBI to insure that our Agents begin to work themselves into good physical condition, at least those who are not. That we know our weapons; that we know how to utilize them under all kinds of conditions; that we think in terms of what armor we may need, what equipment we may need: searchlights, axes, maybe even a CO₂ fire extinguisher.

Let your mind roam as you try to think in terms of your contingency plans. Tactics. How are we going to

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do this? Who is going to do it? How are we going to be identified? How many are needed? What kind of weapons will be utilized? What preparations will be made before the final assault is made?

Terrain. What do we need to know about the terrain? It's almost, you know, as though you were back in the military thinking maybe about a pillbox on Peleliu or on Iwo. I see nobody else stepping in to do the job and its still us, we have to do it.

The key, really, gentlemen, is intelligence before, during and after, and then these other factors that I've just mentioned come into play. On the one hand I think you realize that the terrorist, the pure terrorist--and I'm thinking now about the politically-motivated terrorist--he invites either negotiation or the immediate assault. It all depends on the developing events. The sniper, on the other hand, you have to dig out and kill; it's that simple.

The terrorist with hostages poses different problems. The immediate assault may result in immediate death to the hostages, all of them, and to some of the terrorists and to some of the police. Is this a situation in which you jawbone instead of assault immediately. I think so. But once again the awesome responsibility rests on the commander

on the spot who has to make that terrible decision. The sniper, no. I think you prepare him and then I think you assault him and I think you kill him.

Is the terrorist, the sniper, a job for the Armed Forces, the Army, or the Marines, or is this really a police responsibility? Who in our society has addressed this question? If the latter, the police responsibility as it now appears to be, we have a lot of work to do just to get in the proper physical condition to meet this threat; then training in weaponry, specialized training in weaponry, in all kinds of weaponry. Maybe it's even mortars, who knows? I don't know what the next one is going to produce; you don't know, unless your intelligence is a lot better than ours and we think ours is pretty good. In demolition, how many men do you have trained in demolition? In psychological warfare-- there may even be time for that depending upon the situation. And then finally in the assault itself.

I think we've got a lot of restudying to do with regard to this specialized role which has been thrust upon us. I know that we in the FBI because of the recent enactment of legislation have been doing plenty of studying, plenty of contingency planning, and I have just ordered within the last two days further action to be taken on the creation of hypothetical situations and those situations to be war

gamed and practiced out under the most realistic conditions in order to save lives of Special Agents: .

I don't care about the terrorists, I don't care about the snipers. They are lawless, wild animals, jungle killers, and I'm not interested in their psychology, their philosophy, their sociology or the causes that made them become a sniper. Our job is different. When they are doing their thing our job is to stop them and to protect the lives of our fellow citizens because this is our duty. For the foreseeable future we are on the streets, not the Army or the Marines. We have the responsibility.

As I said to Assistant Director Miller this morning when he told me that this symposium was going well I said, "how do you know it's going well?" I have been extremely interested in each and everyone of these symposiums that we have held here at the FBI National Academy because basically the suggestion for these came in part from my meetings early last summer with the Chiefs of Police that I met with over a period of time: them asking us to use our facilities, our forum, to bring together police leaders, police executives in various types of forums, and we have tried to do this and in connection with each one of those we have given a great deal of time and personal attention to it to make sure that they are meaningful.

If we are delivering up to you Pablum in any way, have the courtesy and the brotherhood, because we're in the same profession, to tell us because we want to make these symposiums meaningful to you and meaningful to us.

We see it from one side but I ask in the interests of the law enforcement profession as a whole that you not hold back your criticism and that you be constructive in your criticism. It's very easy to be destructive you know. "The New York Times" jumped all over the New Orleans Police Department yesterday, but what would "The New York Times" have done had they been on the scene? What command position would they have taken? What orders would they have issued?

Thank you very much for being with us.

- 10 -

Greenberg/Gray-3361

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10/26/72 5:42 P TCF [redacted]
to 5:52P

1. On Airman
2. I talked to ESM
3. [redacted] + Tom Smith want direct
liaison with Troop Cdr so that we can
have it in writing. b6
b7C
4. [redacted] - This we cannot do. b6
- the Pres. has to order it. b7C
- Agreement with DoD + DZ
5. hpg - we have to work out procedures
for this.
6. Told him my views - Not a Platoon or a
Bn., but spec. troops
with spec. capability
7. What job do U envision
these spec. troops?
8. Told him we had to be ready to go on an
instant's notice + not wait 24 or 48 hrs
to get assault troops if needed. We
must provide for this contingency - Pres.
will want this.


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b6
b7C

2/8/73

CW



10³⁰ to 11¹⁰ A

1. Full board mtg. on Thurs. & Fri. of last wk.
 2. Prob. now is mechanical one.
 3. Sensitivity of material is at issue.
-
1. Our charge was to look at human intelligence.

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

7/25/72

Conf. with Wm. Sullivan

10:30 to 11:15A

1. I'd like to save as much \$'s as Dept. has in mind. (U)
2. We can use DG computers & save \$ 30 to 40 thousand. (U)
3. LAG-III - pointed out 1st instance (U)
4. We will need some of the 5th floor. (U)
5. Another way to save \$'s is on Security. (U)
6. I have 4 rooms in Fed. Bldg. to swap for 4 rooms in DG. (U)
7. I'm concerned about the \$'s says Wm. S. (U)

May I shift to another subject.

(U) (a) Indications of I left were that FBI was penetrated by Soviets. (S)

(U) (b) [redacted] who he worked in said KGB had news of our operations; I've never known if he is bona fide. (S)

(C) (c) [redacted] is also involved; I've dismissed it with [redacted] (S)

(d) [redacted] is in Chicago; very experienced in our espionage (U)

b6
b7C

(U) (e) I tried hard to check them out & I just don't know. I tried a face to face test on [redacted] after he said we were giving [redacted] low quality info, [redacted] always complained - yet we were giving [redacted] good stuff. We don't have solid ev. on [redacted] at all. (S)

b6
b7C

(U) (f) Asked [redacted] to suggest ways to check if FBI is penetrated; [redacted] said let me give it some thought & I'll make suggestions. (S)

(g) It may be helpful if U talk this over to [redacted] we have (U)

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~~SECRET~~

(U) (L) We were told Soviets had our surveillance codes - (C)

(a) LPG raised subject of opening Legat in Brussels -
discussed. (U)

(a) [redacted] - Detroit F.O. [Oswald case] (U)
b6
b7C

(a) [redacted] - Oregon - Cassidy, Yungabla. (U)
b6
b7C

On walking out told him he would not appoint Brennan
as A/D. - SAC WFO perhaps - (U)

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~~SECRET~~

*Accordion File
"Statutes & Exec. Orders"*

② Mr. Baker

3/22/73

Mr. E. S. Miller

T. J. Smith

1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

CONFIRMATION TESTIMONY
RESPONSE TO JOHN T. ELLIFF
TESTIMONY REGARDING FBI
INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY

Mr. Tishy

Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Baker	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Cleveland	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Galt	_____
Mr. Jenkins	_____
Mr. Marshall	_____
Mr. Miller, E.S.	_____
Mr. Rogers	_____
Mr. Thompson	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holmes	_____
Mr. Armstrong	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Mr. Keady	_____
Mr. Lister	_____
Mrs. Neenan	_____

During testimony of Professor John T. Elliff before the Senate Judiciary Committee on 3/6/73, he implied that the FBI lacks legislative authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations.

We have previously conducted exhaustive research into the question of FBI authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations relating to the national security. Based on the prior research, a write-up has been prepared for the Acting Director's possible use in responding to a question relating to Professor Elliff's premise. This write-up is attached.

In view of the legal technicalities involved in this question, however, it is believed this write-up should be reviewed by Office of Legal Counsel before the Acting Director takes an official stand, based on this write-up.

ACTION:

Write-up attached for possible use of the Acting Director in replying to questions concerning testimony of Professor John T. Elliff.

Enclosure

TJS:glw
(6)

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APR 11 1973

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STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN T. ELLIFF BEFORE THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 3/6/73

ISSUE: The FBI is in large part an arm of the Presidency. The primary foundation for the Bureau's domestic intelligence role is inherent executive power. Should the President direct an agency to conduct investigations and secure intelligence without explicit legislative authority?

POSITION-REBUTTAL: The FBI is the investigative arm of the Department of Justice and the Department of Justice is a part of the Executive Branch. It follows, then, that the FBI is one of the investigative arms of the Presidency, but not the sole one. For instance, the Secret Service is an investigative arm of the Treasury Department and the Postal Inspection Service is the investigating arm of the Postal Service. Other branches of the Executive Department likewise have investigative services and all would be considered an investigative arm of the Presidency.

What troubles Dr. Elliff is the fact that the FBI, alone among the investigative services of the Executive Branch, has an intelligence role which bears on the President's responsibility to protect the national security. Dr. Elliff feels that this FBI role is based on inherent executive power; that the FBI secures intelligence without explicit legislative authority. He obviously questions the extent of the President's inherent executive power. The courts have carefully sidestepped the issue of just what the inherent executive power is and to what extent it can be used.

Overlooked by Dr. Elliff, however, is the fact that the FBI has been designated to handle legislative enactments having to do with the national security. Whether the statute is espionage, sabotage, insurrection or rebellion, seditious conspiracy, or advocacy of overthrow of the Government, the FBI not only has the statutory responsibility to investigate violations of the statutes, it also has the responsibility to identify individuals likely to engage in attempts or conspiracies to violate these statutes. Statutes designed to protect the national security; to deter persons from engaging in activity which would result in the unlawful overthrow of the government must surely be also designed to enable the government to take defensive action; to engage in investigative activity to discover plots; to secure intelligence data which will neutralize unlawful efforts.

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The Supreme Court dealt with this concept in its ruling in 1951 relating to the validity of the Smith Act. Justice Vinson, in discussing the issue of whether a violation may be sustained only when the speech or publication created a 'clear and present danger' of attempting or accomplishing the prohibited crime (advocacy of overthrow of the government), wrote, "Obviously, these words cannot mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid, and the signal is waited--we must, therefore, reject the contention that success or probability of success is the criterion."

With specific reference to Dr. Elliff's views which would narrow the inherent executive powers of the President, an analogy can be drawn in a fear expressed by Justice Jackson in connection with three court decisions finding against the Executive authority, that: "There is danger that if the courts do not temper their doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom they will convert our constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact."

We find no fault with Dr. Elliff's contention that the Congress should consider legislative enactments which would clearly provide the FBI with specific statutory responsibility to collect essential national security intelligence information. However, we believe that consistent with provisions of the constitution, particularly with respect to the first, fourth and fifth amendments, the FBI has a lawful basis for its national security intelligence investigations, and that the President's requirement for national security intelligence can be met by the FBI without abridging the rights of any citizen.

MR. GRAY'S RESPONSE: While we believe that in the interest of clarity the FBI's investigative jurisdiction with respect to investigations relating to national security should be specifically described and enumerated in a specific legislative enactment we also believe that investigations currently being conducted concerning national security are firmly based in existing Federal law.

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7c

(U)



2/21/73 (U)

1. Mail Project

(U)

To & From ~~Soviet Bloc~~
Countries

OR

To ~~Soviet Union~~ Only.

(C)

2. ~~Guy~~ in NYC. in our pay is no longer doing it. (U)

3. Issue is whether to cancel or turn over to FBI (U)

4. We have a signal that an audio job of ~~Indonesian~~
(U) ~~Embassy~~ may be required when new ~~amb.~~
arrives - (S)

We are going to have to do more in Intell. with less
\$'s requiring greater cooperation. (U)

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Mr. E. S. Miller

3/12/73

T. J. Smith

TESTIMONY OF JOHN T. ELLIFF
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
MARCH 8, 1973
CONFIRMATION HEARINGS

With respect to Professor John T. Elliff's testimony on 3/8/73 before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Mr. Gray has raised three points: 1) He has instructed that Division V come up fast with a paper on changes in operations since 5/3/73; 2) He inquired as to what indexes we still maintain in Division V; 3) He inquired if (Walter) Pincus is right; if we did furnish information as described by Pincus and related by Elliff to the effect the FBI disseminated information concerning a connection between McGovern and the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW).

We have prepared three separate writeups in response to the three points raised by Mr. Gray. These writeups are attached and answer the questions asked by Mr. Gray.

With specific reference to ^{the} intelligence referred to by Pincus, this data was part of the information being furnished on a regular basis to the White House and Department of Justice regarding potential for violence and disruption during both political conventions. At no time was any purely political information disseminated by the FBI.

ACTION:

In response to the request of the Acting Director.

Enclosures

TJS:bjr
(6)

- 2 - Mr. Baker
1 - Mr. Miller
1 - Mr. Shackelford
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
- John T. Elliff*
T. J. Smith

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Noted
10/10/79
10/10/79

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March 12, 1973

CHANGES IN OPERATIONS OF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
SINCE MAY 3, 1972

The Liaison Section, which had been abolished by Mr. Hoover, was reestablished in the Intelligence Division effective November 13, 1972. The Section is now staffed by five Special Agent Supervisors who have reestablished contacts at all levels within the principal departments or agencies of the U. S. Government, while continuing to maintain liaison with The White House. This Section also maintains liaison with foreign government agencies in the United States which are FBI counterparts and directs activities of FBI Legal Attaches abroad who maintain liaison contact with FBI counterparts in countries outside of the communist bloc. (u)

(OFF THE RECORD) The Acting Director has authorized Special Agents being utilized under suitable pretext or cover to engage in attempts to penetrate the Weatherman underground. Ultimate purpose is to locate and apprehend Weatherman fugitives, while simultaneously developing any data indicating potential acts of violence directed against the U. S. Government, such as the bombing of the U. S. Capitol and bombing of the Pentagon. (u)

(OFF THE RECORD) The Acting Director has removed the quota system for use of electronic surveillances which was the practice followed by Mr. Hoover. The test is necessity in protection of the national security and not whether any specific number are currently being used. All, of course, must meet the facts and circumstances test of the Keith decision. (u)

The Acting Director has broadened the responsibility of Special Agents in Charge by permitting the SAC to authorize certain operational procedures which formerly required Headquarters approval. Included are such things as:

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- (U) 1. Authorization of interviews of persons in contact with ~~Soviet or Soviet-bloc~~ establishments in most cases. (C)
2. Relaxation on use of rental automotive equipment for use on physical surveillances. SAC also can now authorize their use. (U)
3. Authorization of interviews of most subjects of subversive-type and revolutionary activity-type investigations. (U)

The Acting Director has also approved an overhaul of reporting procedures which resulted in streamlined reporting and elimination of unnecessary reporting. (U)

Also approved was revision of a Key Black Extremist Program, which is a program designed to provide intensified investigation of key black extremists, to include key Klan and white-hate extremists. It is now known as the Key Extremist Program. (U)

Also revised is our Extremist Informant Program, which resulted in elimination of the ghetto informant "listening post" concept. (U)

Approved was drastic revision of the Administrative Index (ADEX). ADEX, which was established in November, 1971, following abolishment of the Security Index, originally contained about 13,000 names of individuals who, under procedures outlined in the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 (repealed in September, 1971), would have been considered for emergency apprehension during time of national emergency resulting from enemy attack. (U)

With abolishment of the Security Index, there was no isolated list of individuals believed to represent a threat to the national security. ADEX was created to fill this need. After study of the listings contained

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ROSTER OF PARTICIPANTS

SAC Anderson, Clark D.	San Juan
SAC Fehl, Frederick C.	New York (SAC- Criminal)
SAC Gebhardt, Robert E.	San Francisco
SAC Handley, James L.	Boston
SAC Held, Richard G.	Minneapolis
SAC Huelskamp, Bernard L.	Salt Lake City
SAC Kunkel, Robert G.	Washington Field
SAC Larson, Arnold C.	Oklahoma City
SAC Mattson, Julius Lee	Portland
SAC Milnes, James E.	Seattle
SAC Moreland, James T.	Springfield
SAC Reed, John M.	Sacramento
SAC Santoiana, J. F., Jr.	Tampa
SAC Sheridan, Philip R.	Norfolk
SAC Startzell, James	New York (SAC- Espionage)
SAC Sullivan, William A.	Philadelphia
SAC Thompson, Fletcher D.	Omaha
SAC Weeks, Charles E.	New Haven
SAC Jamieson, Joe David	Los Angeles
SAC Linberg, Elmer F.	Jackson

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Greenberg/Gray-3374

62 - 118045 - (212x)

FIRST DAY

Management Seminar

Seminar Leader -

b6
b7C

Management Instructors

b6
b7C

Seminar Objectives

- (1) To increase the participants' awareness of the primary management functions and processes;
- (2) To increase the participants' understanding of how techniques, procedures and methods embodied in the sound practice of management functions and processes can be realistically applied in the Bureau;
- (3) To develop the participants' ability to use these techniques and methods in his daily functions, and
- (4) To provide those in attendance with texts and printed material which can be used for reference and self-study after the seminar is completed.

Program

9:00 a.m. - 11:00 a.m. Nature and Importance of Management

This seminar is designed to indoctrinate those in attendance with the background of modern management, patterns of management analysis, the functions and authority of the manager, the manager and his environment as well as comparative management. It is intended to produce in-depth discussions of such areas as the organizational man, philosophy of management, and management by objectives.

b6
b7C


11:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m. Motivational Research in Management

This portion of the seminar will demonstrate the factors important in human relations, recent findings in

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motivational research, communication, and leadership styles. It will stress human behavior in organizations with emphasis on the individual, group, intergroup and other human behavior and development; application of social science research to administration. Practical applications will be emphasized.



Texts:

(1) Principles of Management: An Analysis of Managerial Functions. Doontz and O'Donnell, 5th Edition, McGraw Hill: New York;

(2) Management of Organizational Behavior. Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972.

1:00 - 2:00	Lunch	
2:00 - 3:00	Seminar--General Crimes	Mr. Bates and Staff
3:00 - 4:00	Open Forum General Crimes	
4:00 - 5:30	Seminar--Investigative Problems	Mr. E. S. Miller and Staff
	Domestic Intelligence	

SECOND DAY

9:00 - 10:00	Open Forum--Domestic Intelligence Division	
10:00 - 11:30	Seminar--Investigative Problems--Organized Crime, Fugitives and Special Inquiry	Mr. Cleveland and Staff
11:30 - 2:00	Lunch	
2:00 - 3:00	Open Forum--Special Investigative Division	
3:00 - 4:00 ^{4:00}	Discussion with selected Assistant Directors at Offices	Messrs. Bates, Baker, Bishop, Callahan, Cleveland, Conrad, Dalbey, Jenkins, Marshall, E. S. Miller, Ponder, Soyars*, Walters* Mr. Felt, Mr. Gray
4:00 - 5:00		

*Space for Messrs Soyars and Walters will be provided in the Training Division, across from Room 5231, in the Justice Building.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

9/25, 1972

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Acting Director	Mooney	Adams
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Felt	Holis	Binning
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Bates	Brownfield	Duhr
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Bishop	Carter	Dunaway
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Callahan	Hardin	
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Cleveland	McGinley	Mr. Felt
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Conrad	Montefior	Mr. Baker
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Dalbey	Reilly, J.	Mr. Bates
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Jenkins	Stewart	Mr. Bishop
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Marshall	Brewster	Mr. Callahan
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Miller, E. S.	Cotter	Mr. Cleveland
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Ponder	Gump	Mr. Conrad
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Soyars	Hyland	Mr. Dalbey
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Walters	Kirsch	Mr. Jenkins
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Campbell	Shanahan	Mr. Marshall
<input type="checkbox"/> Mrs. Neenan	Stack	Mr. Miller, E.S.
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Kinley	Tullai	Mr. Ponder
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Armstrong		Mr. Soyars
<input type="checkbox"/> Ms. Herwig		Mr. Walters
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Davidson, 4529		Tele. Room
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Bassett, 4519		Mr. Kinley
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Jones, 4264		Mr. Armstrong
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Malmfeldt, 4718		Ms. Herwig
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Row #221 IB	Mr.	Mrs. Neenan
<input type="checkbox"/> Exhibits, 331 OPO		
<input type="checkbox"/> Info. Desk, 5545	Room	
<input type="checkbox"/> Mail Room, 5531		
<input type="checkbox"/> Teletype Room 5646		
<input type="checkbox"/> Mechanical Sec B-110		
<input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Files, 6644		
<input type="checkbox"/> Reading Room, 5533		
<input type="checkbox"/> Records Branch		

☐ See Me, Please
☐ Phone Me, Please
☐ For Approp Action
☐ Note & Return
☐ Please Handle
☐ Record & Return
☐ Per Call
☐ For Approval

TRAINING DIVISION

Room

Ext.

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9/26/72

CW SAC's.

9⁰⁰ for 9¹⁵ A

George Moore D.I.

1. Rpt. Writing SAC Memo 21-72

If you rec. a person for ADEX
submit a summary, particularly
a terrorist.

Manpower

Proper Utilization

Exceptions:

(a)

(b) Complicated case - you have option to rpt.

Field has spread the germ.

2. Ghetto informant program: W's Rose Toot +

(a) If informant is good at all, he is furnishing cr. activity
info and also marker info.

(b) It has been rec. that we have the Toots get
the best.

R.C.G. (c) Why should we limit the big numbers?

Let the SAC judge.

F.T.

(d) We check too long in numbers.

J.M.

(e) You are not really setting a limit are you?

No

Let the SAC decide what
he needs.

E. Melus.

(f) You better tell Insp. about this.

E.S.M.

(g)

B

Paul Sullivan (R)

Is the ghetto program worthwhile; why not cut
it + beef up the Extremist program?

Paperwork in the field is too much to handle

977 (i) Set a quality standard & 4 we cut down
on the numbers.

Joe Sutorani
Swade Larson (j) We need these ⁸⁰ testing posts -

Bob Kunkle (k)

- Q. Does the FBI make its own decisions as to what to investigate and what not to investigate? Is that a responsibility or duty that you have as Director or as Acting Director? Can you clarify this for the Committee?
- A. Investigative jurisdiction of the FBI is specifically conferred by statute, directives of the President, and orders of the Attorney General. Therefore, neither the FBI nor I as its Acting Director make the decision as to what to investigate and what not to investigate.

Upon assignment of a specific Federal law to the FBI for investigative responsibility, a policy for investigation under this law is established through consultation with the Department of Justice. This policy establishes uniformity in the investigation of complaints or allegations of violations of the particular statute.

Investigation is conducted when information is received indicating that there has occurred a violation of a Federal law over which the FBI has been given investigative jurisdiction. Results of our investigations are furnished the United States Attorney or the Department of Justice for determination of the course of any prosecutive action.

Requests for FBI investigations in selected civil matters in which the United States is or may be a party in interest are received from the United States Attorneys and/or the Department of Justice. These are handled in strict conformity with guidelines furnished by the Department as are also investigations of violations of the civil rights, antiriot, election laws, and antitrust laws. Further, where there is uncertainty whether investigation would be consistent with Department policy, the issue is resolved by referral to the Attorney General for decision.

The practical implementation of investigative policy within the perimeters of our investigative jurisdiction is done by supervisory control in each field office and at FBI Headquarters.

A-29

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(6-20-72)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
LEGAL COUNSEL

7/6, 1972

TO:

☒ The Director
☐ Mr. Felt
☐ Mr. Bates
☐ Mr. Bishop
☐ Mr. Callahan
☐ Mr. Campbell
☐ Mr. Cleveland
☐ Mr. Conrad
☐ Mr. Dalbey
☐ Mr. Marshall
☐ Mr. E. S. Miller
☐ Mr. Ponder
☐ Mr. Soyars
☐ Mr. Walters
☐ Mr. Kinley
☐ Mr. Armstrong
☐ Ms. Herwig
☐ Mrs. Neenan

☐ Mr. Mintz
☐ Mr. Boutwell
☐ Mr. Burke
☐ Mr. Donelan
☐ Mr. Hotis
☐ Mr. McLaughlin
☐ Mr. Miller
☐ Mr. Williamson

☐ Miss Devine
☐ Miss Hardy

☐ See Me, Please
☐ Call Me, Please

☐ Note & Return
☐ For appropriate
action

*Supervisor of possible
interest to you*
J. D. King

Legal Counsel
Room 5642

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7/6/72

TRAINING DIVISION

CATION: The new location of the Academy substantially interferes with what
ce was a prime attraction for law enforcement officers-an opportunity to
e the sights in the Capital. Most of the classes formerly were held here,
t at Quantico, and the officers spent a part of their weekends as tourists.
is will not now be possible except by special arrangements for transporta-
on. We might be wise to arrange some system by which the students can char-
ter buses to the Capital on weekend days.

TENDANCE: Some think that we will have difficulty in filling the 500 man
ota for each session of the FBI National Academy, at least if we adhere to
e present quality standards. They reason to this conclusion from three
ctors, as follows:

1. Present Academy graduates, who occupy many responsible positions
in law enforcement, are not anxious to send many of the men under
them. A graduate always has enjoyed high status locally, which would
be substantially diluted by numbers.
2. Most law enforcement agencies are perennially shorthanded and are
reluctant to send more than one man now and then.
3. Many officers and their departments are now "degree conscious" and
can meet this need through local colleges and community colleges.
Many officers are paid higher salaries for college credit obtained.
They can ~~xxxxx~~ reach this objective without having to spend 12
weeks here.

we fail to achieve and maintain the 500 man quota we may be faced with

another request, or even a demand, to allow the Academy to be used to train Agents from Secret Service and other federal agencies. Mr. Hoover previously had such requests from some Congressmen and from the Office of Management and Budget. He rejected them on the ground that the Academy would be filled to capacity with policemen. The result was that a separate academy for other federal law enforcement agencies was scheduled to be built in Prince Georges County, Maryland. I understand, however, that construction is stalled for some reason. Perhaps those who want us to assist in training for other agencies will have another try at their proposal. Moreover, it is possible that some might propose a "spinoff" in which the Academy becomes some sort of National Training Center for Law Enforcement, separated from FBI management.

CURRICULUM: I suggest that a close look should be taken at the curriculum for the FBI National Academy. We are the Federal Bureau of Investigation and, presumably, the ablest criminal investigators in the nation. But we teach very little "investigation" in the Academy. We teach firearms, defensive tactics, law, forensic science, fingerprint matters, police management, sociology, psychology, etc., but nothing of consequence in homicide investigation, robbery investigation, and so on. It seems to me that training in these latter subjects would be of prime interest to the officer and his community.

Past defects in the curriculum, if any, had little or no effect on the popularity of the FBI National Academy. Many officers have told me that what they learned here was quite secondary to the fact that upon graduation they were ushered into an elite status of great potential benefit to their careers. If

a value to the officer of this elite status is substantially reduced by a large volume of graduates, as ~~many~~ many present graduates frankly fear, we find it wise to tailor a curriculum of maximum practical value to the officer in his daily work. Otherwise, what special attraction has our Academy offer over and beyond what the officer can find in his local college? The better institutions can teach, and do teach, a number of courses similar to our own.

Perhaps it would be wise to start polling the students by official questionnaires on possible changes in the curriculum. What do we offer too much of, or too little of? What courses might be discarded, and what new courses added? I think we have not been quite so openminded with the students in the past, but perhaps the time has come for a change. Now that we will be selling less status and more product we had best make sure that the "customer" is as satisfied with the product as we can make him, as sure as we can that our product is sufficiently unique in its practical value that it is much better than anything to be had elsewhere.

INSTRUCTORS: The following points concerning the instructor staff may need to be inquired into at some time:

1. Expertise. The present FBI National Academy class is the first, to my knowledge, in which the Bureau violations are taught to the class by instructors who are essentially "academics," not responsible for supervision of those violations. We long have had lectures to the Academy on Bank Robbery, Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles, and other violations on which we ~~gaxxx~~ get a lot of help from the police. The object was to increase the help and cooperation that we get from them. The lectures were given by a supervisor assigned to the desk handling that violation. That no longer is true; the violations will be taught by members of the instruction staff at Quantico.

I suppose that I am in the minority in saying this, but it seems obvious to me that a subject is best taught by an instructor who "lives" that violation in his daily work. He is the most knowledgeable about it, and is the most interested in encouraging police cooperation in that field. He will show the most enthusiasm, a quality that is infectious. He will be listened to more carefully, having been introduced as the real "expert" in the area. In short, I submit, he will do a better job for everyone.

The change was made because of problems created for the General Investigative Division and others in sending their supervisors to Quantico rather than simply down the hall when the classes were

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held in this building. I am not entirely satisfied, however, that these problems could not be resolved by scheduling and by assigning a few extra supervisors to the division concerned so that the instruction continues being given by the "real experts."

2. Salary. We have instructors at Quantico drawing salaries as high as department heads in some large universities, ^{AND HIGHER.} With this I have no quarrel, but it is a possible ~~source~~ ^{area} of criticism. I think the reputation of the FBI is such that Congress and the Executive will continue to go along with unusually high pay for ^{those} FBI Agents who pursue major criminals and who supervise such work. I doubt, however, that the Congress and the Executive would stand still for salaries like those described above being paid to Agents who are teachers only. If I am correct in this, the answer may be in "Tenure," below.

3. Tenure. If a full time teaching assignment at Quantico is held to a limited term, such as 2 or 3 years, the Agent so assigned would be regarded as a regular Special Agent for all purposes who is only temporarily assigned to teaching. The Armed Services apparently handle such matters in this way. An officer is given a "tour of duty" (2 years, I have heard) at West Point, Annapolis, or Colorado Springs and is for that period at teacher. At the end of the period, however, he returns to regular duties. This may be the answer to the pay problem described above. As to the instructors from Office of Legal Counsel, I would hope that their tour of duty as instructors would be a

ong step toward administrative advancement for them.

4. Titles. I suggest the thought that titles such as "Dean" of this and "Dean" of that, which I hear are being considered, may be a bit pretentious for an institution that is essentially a training school rather than a college, and in which the longest class lasts only ¹⁴~~12~~ weeks. Also, it would be more consistent with the tenure theory mentioned above if the Quantico hierarchy used only the standard Bureau titles.

SIGNMENT OF DUTIES: I suggest that there should be the sharpest ^{line}~~line~~ of demarcation drawn between administrative duties and academic duties, so that either Inspector will have any reason or justification for crossing over to the area of the other. It is sound business practice, as you know, to grant employee full authority in a carefully delineated area and to then hold him completely responsible for that area. This is the way, I understand, that colleges are run. The business manager has no direct control over faculty and curriculum and whoever controls the latter has no control over physical operations and finances.

IAL AND RELIGIOUS: There seems some potential for trouble here, though I am unable to estimate how much.

1. Race. To my knowledge, there is not a single black man on the staff at Quantico. This is unfortunate. If we school 2,000 officers per year you can be reasonably sure that there will be quite a few blacks

among them. The absence of a black on the faculty will stand out like a sore thumb. Bear in mind, also, that we investigate police departments for civil rights violations, and that we are required to not participate in any training school which practices racial discrimination. Under all these circumstances, the absence of a black on the faculty does not make us look very good.

2. Religious. This is a sensitive subject and I hesitated before writing about it, but I am going to tell you frankly what I think-members of the Roman Catholic faith are so completely in control of the Training Division that it could prove embarrassing. For example, when Mr. Casper was still here, the following were of that faith: Assistant Director; No. 1 Man; SAC at Quantico; and at least four of the six Unit Chiefs. The situation is still about the same. It is my guess that some police officers pick this fact up while here, and that it is not good advertising for the FBI. Our society is supposed to be committed to a little better balance than that.

I am sensitive to such matters, and so are many others, and I practice what I preach. Before the transfer of Hotis, we were 9 in this small division. Of those 9, there were 3 Roman Catholics, one Greek Orthodox, and 5 Protestants, which I think a pretty fair mix. I will not turn down a capable Catholic to hire a Protestant, nor vice versa, but I admit to having juggled a bit to keep a decent balance. In such matters I think we must be like Ceasar's wife.

Nor do my observations spring, I contend, from bias. I graduated

Greenberg/Gray-3391


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from DePaul University College of Law, a Jesuit school, and in no place have I ever been better treated. I contribute to the school as an alumnus. Moreover, I recognize that the reverse of the Training Division may be true in other places. An Agent whom I consider an astute observer, and fair-minded, has told me that a Roman Catholic has a hard time making his way in the Laboratory. If true, this is equally bad.

I have heard it said on the outside that the FBI is predominantly a Roman Catholic organization. I have denied it and would deny it again. My own personal experience does not lend any credence to a theory that my career has been hampered because I am a Protestant. Yet this whole subject, on both sides, is a delicate matter on which it behooves us to maintain a proper appearance.

GENERAL: I suggest that at this time you need a tighter rein and closer control on the Training Division than on any other. The others are continuing their usual ways and you can get to them in time. But the Training Division, because of the large expansion incident to the new program, is in an "empire building" phase and might need close supervision until it settles down.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 24, 1973

PERSONAL ATTENTION

MEMORANDUM 18-73

Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Lister	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Gebhardt	_____
Mr. Jenkins	_____
Mr. Marshall	_____
Mr. Miller, E.S.	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Mr. Thompson	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Kinley	_____
Mr. Armstrong	_____
Mr. Gandy	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Mr. Sizoo	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Mr. Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

MEMORANDUM TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

(A) EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY - PLAN OF ACTION FOR 1973 -- Reference is made to SAC Letter 72-18 (B) dated, March 28, 1972, which enclosed a copy of the Bureau's Plan of Action for 1972. There is enclosed a copy of the Bureau's Plan of Action for 1973, which replaces that for 1972. You should carefully review the Plan and insure it is applied. You will be furnished additional copies of the Plan separately and copies should be made available to employees and the public upon request.

Your attention is directed to Objective Number 73-2, Item A, which specifically states that the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity Affairs will maintain statistical data on the accomplishments of field offices with respect to the number of minority individuals recruited for all positions and women for the position of Special Agent, as well as the number of minority employees and female Special Agents working in each office. While it is recognized that assignments of Special Agents are decided at FBIHQ, Special Agents in Charge will be expected to insure that representative numbers of minority group employees are included on the clerical staffs of their offices. Additionally, although not specifically mentioned in this year's Plan, Special Agents in Charge will be expected to continue to utilize minority Special Agents in recruitment activity. Also where practicable, continue to give consideration to utilizing minority clerical employees in connection with radio and television broadcasts. This is fully consistent with the Bureau's positive Equal Employment Opportunity Program which is set out in detail in Part I, Section 10, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

I want to make it completely clear that although we have no numerical goals as such for the recruitment of minorities, the Bureau does have a continuing basic goal to sustain a steady and substantial increase of employees representing all minorities in all assignments throughout the service. As an organization representing all Americans, the Bureau should be as representative of the American public as possible.

(Security page attached)

4-24-73
MEMORANDUM 18-73

Greenberg/Gray-3393

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DATE 9/10/79 BY 6076 WDAH/AB

(B) ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVITIES - INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST -- You were advised by teletype dated March 19, 1973, of information received indicating possible targeting of FBI personnel by members or sympathizers of Al Fatah for violent measures such as letter bombs.

In view of this information, immediate steps should be taken to strengthen security regarding publication of home addresses and home telephone numbers of our personnel and the identification of our employees as members of the FBI. All investigative personnel should be encouraged to obtain unlisted telephone numbers. All Agents assigned to investigations involving Al Fatah members or sympathizers should be furnished full details, including descriptive material, concerning letter bombs so that they may properly caution other members of their families who might receive mail at their residences. All personnel, particularly those in switchboard and information-type assignments, should have reiterated to them the proper procedures for answering inquiries concerning employees. It should be made clear to all employees that residence addresses or other personal data should not be divulged and any inquiries for same should be routed through supervisory personnel for appropriate evaluation.

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director


Enclosure for (A)

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MEMORANDUM 18-73

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Greenberg/Gray-3394

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PERSONAL ATTENTION
MEMORANDUM 4-72

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 7, 1972

Memorandum to All Special Agents in Charge:

(A) WEIGHT STANDARDS -- Present weight standards have been revised. New weight standards for Special Agents and Special Agent applicants, male and female, are incorporated into the enclosed revised FD-300, the attachment to SF-88, Report of Medical Examination. Special Agents are weighed on the occasion of their Government physical examinations. Henceforth no other regular weighing of Special Agents is necessary. However, Division Heads, Special Agents in Charge, Inspectors, and other Officials may, of course, weigh Special Agents anytime circumstances indicate such action is called for. The existing requirement that male clerical employees and applicants comply with the weight standards as shown on FD-300 is being rescinded.

The revised weight standards continue to be related to an individual's height and frame. The Bureau recognizes that in some few cases individuals may have larger frames and bone structure than would be evaluated as Large. This is likely applicable primarily to some young people today who have larger frames and bone structure than in the past because of better nutrition and diet during formative years. The Bureau recognizes that in certain rare cases there may be those whose frames definitely exceed Large. Accordingly, exceptions to the weight standards set forth in revised FD-300 will be granted only where a Government medical examiner specifies that the frame of a given individual exceeds Large and specifies a maximum weight for that individual which exceeds the maximum on the chart. Each Special Agent in Charge should make it completely clear to the Government medical examiners at the facilities affording examinations of FBI Special Agents and Special Agent applicants that exceptions should be granted only where medically proper in the evaluation of the examiner. I do not expect exceptions because an individual with no more than a Large frame does not wish to keep weight within the proper limit.

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Greenberg/Gray-3395

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These changes are being effected only after very careful consideration and should not be construed as a diminishing of the Bureau's concern over the maintenance of desirable weight by all employees. To the contrary, it is the Bureau's aim to apply weight standards which are reasonable for our Special Agent staff to maintain good health, an excellent business-like personal appearance, and capacity to properly perform the work involved.

Even though the revised weight standards are directly applicable to Special Agents and Special Agent applicants, there is no lessening of emphasis on maintenance of proper weight by all clerical employees. In this regard reliance will be placed on the evaluation of the interviewer concerning personal appearance of applicants and on the evaluation of the rating official as to personal appearance on performance rating reports of employees.

I wish to make it clear that the minimum height for Special Agent applicants is 5'7" for both males and females. The weight standards on the revised FD-300 begin with a height of 5'4" for men and 5' for women as heretofore so that the standards will be useful as a reference guide for clerical applicants and employees, particularly with respect to pre-employment physicals. A supply of the revised FD-300 is being sent separately and manual and form revisions are also being prepared.

6/7/72

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(B) EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY -- Enclosed for your information is a copy of a press release announcing the establishment of the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity Affairs. Representatives of the Office will visit field offices, meet with community leaders and other prime sources of recruitment, and assess and stimulate field programs. One objective of the establishment of the office is to provide visual and tangible evidence of the sincerity of the Bureau's program and these visits to field offices will be a part of this theme. It should be completely clear, however, that I am vesting in each Special Agent in Charge the responsibility for application of a forward looking Equal Employment Opportunity program in his office with attendant partici-

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pation by representatives of each office. In this regard, I expect that the Bureau's Plan of Action for 1972 as transmitted by SAC Letter 72-18 of 3/28/72 will be vigorously implemented. Circulation of opportunities in the FBI for minority group members and attraction of those interested and qualified remain the responsibility of field offices. Accomplishments will be measured. It is expected that individual field office programs will be regarded as effective and positive on the occasion of assessment by the Inspection staff or representatives of the new Office.

6/7/72

MEMORANDUM 4-72

(C) GROOMING AND PERSONAL APPEARANCE STANDARDS -- We recognize that the manner and style of one's clothing or in which a person wears his or her hair is a matter of personal taste and judgment, as well as a matter of individual pride and self-respect.

All members of the FBI should be advised that the standards for acceptable clothing at work and in the performance of their duties will continue to be that clothing be neat, clean and not extreme. "Extreme" means beyond the usual and customary standard of attire which is contemporary and typical of that worn in the business and professional community.

They should be informed also of the following standards governing hair grooming: (1) Employees of both sexes are expected to maintain a neat appearance and to keep their hair clean and well-groomed at all times. The hair on male employees should be combed back along the sides so that it does not cover any portion of the ear and should be kept at such a length that, if combed straight down, would not extend below the middle of the ear. The hair should be of moderate length in the front and combed so that it does not cover the eyebrow. Hair at the back of the neck shall be cut or groomed so that it does not extend over the top of the shirt collar. (2) The maximum length for sideburns shall be to the bottom of the ear lobe and the hair shall not extend forward in the fashion of "mutton chops." (3) Mustaches may be worn if they are

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of moderate length, are neatly trimmed, and do not extend downward around the corners of the mouth. (4) The rest of the male face must be clean-shaven. Beards are not allowed except in cases of skin ailments medically certified as such that shaving would be impracticable. The "medical" exception will apply throughout the standards but will require that the medical certification be submitted to Bureau Headquarters for concurrence.

Over the years, the dedicated men and women of the Federal Bureau of Investigation have compiled a magnificent record of public service in behalf of the American people. Men and women of the FBI are held in high esteem by our fellow Americans.

The American people trust us and are confident that we will continue to perform our duties in their behalf in an exemplary manner. That degree of trust and confidence was achieved by our outstanding performance of our duties and by the neat, well-groomed appearance we have presented to the American people.

Although performance can never be estimated or judged by appearance alone, the standards of neatness and grooming adhered to by the men and women of the FBI have created in the minds of the American people an image of faithful and professional performance of duty.

Accordingly our appearance has, and will, contribute to the efficiency of our service in behalf of the American people. Therefore, extremes in clothing and in hair length or style are to be avoided.

Sketches will be sent to you separately showing examples of acceptable male hair grooming. They are not to be reproduced and are set out merely for your guidance. It is not intended that anyone should pattern his appearance after any of these illustrations. I believe that all employees will understand the need for such regulations and will give us their fullest cooperation in this matter. Further, I am relying upon you to provide the brand of leadership which may be required within your Division to ensure that these modifications in policy are explained and implemented in a manner in keeping with the finest traditions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Enc. for (A) & (B)

6/7/72
MEMORANDUM 4-72

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director
- 4 -

3-45 (Rev. 9/6/72)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

, 1972

Director's Office	Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr. B-110
Mr. Felt, 5744	Mr. Gregory, B-110
	Mr. Feeney, 4519
Mr. Baker, 5734	Mr. J. Cox, 3230 IB
Mr. Bates, 5706	Mr. Roderick, 3117 IB
Mr. Bishop, 5634	Mr. Day, 912 9&D
Mr. Callahan, 5525	Mr. Dunphy, 331 OPO
Mr. Cleveland, 1742	Mr. Fisher, 7541
Mr. Conrad, 7621	Mr. Healy, 4704
Mr. Dalbey, 5642	Mr. Jackson, 5509
Mr. Jenkins, 5234	Mr. Price, 2264
Mr. Marshall, 7746	Mr. McDonough, 2260
Mr. Miller, 1026 9&D	Mr. McMichael, 5266
Mr. Ponder, 5256	Mr. Perritte, 7110
Mr. Soyars, 3114 IB	Mr. Quinn, 4258
Mr. Walters, 4130 IB	Mr. Row, 6221 IB
Mr. Donahoe, 5734	Mr. Suttler, 4248
Mr. O'Connell, 5519	Mr. Tullai, Quantico
	Mr. Walsh, 5525
Mr. Kinley, 5633	Mr. Beckner, 1521
Mrs. Metcalf, 5633	Mrs. A. Smith, 5302
Mrs. Neenan, 5633	Mr. Haisten, 4732
Miss Smith, 5744	Mrs. Lockhart, 5263
Conveyer Sta., 1213 IB	Mr. W. L. Marshall, 5244
Mail Room, 5531	Mrs. Sisk, 3137 IB
Messenger Room., 7529	Mrs. Smith, 914 9&D
Call Me, Please	Mr. Marsden
See Me, Please	Mr. Atwell
	Mr. Codi
	Mr. Schweitzer

M _____ Room _____

MECHANICAL SECTION

Greenberg/Gray-3399

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DATE 9/10/79 BY 6076 WJA/H/208



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

PERS()AL ATTENTION
MEMORANDUM 24-72
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

October 3, 1972

Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Baker	_____
Mr. Bates	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Cleveland	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Jenkins	_____
Mr. Marshall	_____
Mr. Miller, L.S.	_____
Mr. Ponder	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Kinley	_____
Mr. Armstrong	_____
Mr. Herwig	_____
Miss Neenan	_____

Memorandum to All Special Agents in Charge:

(A) FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - 1972 AMENDMENTS -- The Supreme Court has approved 18 amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and has ordered that they are to go into effect on October 1, 1972.

The amendments vary in importance from those of a mere editorial nature to those clarifying aspects of procedural law which have been uncertain. Your attention is particularly directed to the following amendments:

Rule 1 on "Scope" is amended to make clear that the rules are applicable to courts of the United States and, where a rule so provides, to proceedings before United States Magistrates and state or local judicial officers. State and local judicial officers are governed by the rules only when a rule specifically so provides, as in Rules 3, 4, 5, and 41.

In the past the Initial Appearance before the magistrate and the Preliminary Examination were dealt with together in old Rule 5 on "Proceedings Before the Commissioner." As a result of amendment, however, they are now separated into two rules in order to prevent confusion as to whether they constitute a single or two separate proceedings. Rule 5 is now entitled "Initial Appearance Before the Magistrate," and new Rule 5.1 is entitled "Preliminary Examination."

Rule 5 has been drafted on the assumption that the Initial Appearance is before United States Magistrates as they are deemed to be reasonably available for that purpose; but if experience indicates that frequent appearances must be made before state or local judicial officers, an additional rule must be drafted detailing the procedure before the latter. Rule 5 makes clear that a defendant is not entitled to a Preliminary Examination if he has been indicted by a grand jury

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Greenberg/Gray-3400

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prior to the date set for the Preliminary Examination, or in appropriate cases, if an information is filed in district court prior to that date. Rule 5 also contains time limits within which the Preliminary Examination must be held.

Under new Rule 5.1, the Preliminary Examination must be conducted before a Federal judge or a United States Magistrate. Authority to conduct a Preliminary Examination was not given state or local judicial authorities. Rule 5.1 makes clear that a finding of probable cause may be based on hearsay evidence, in whole or in part, and provides that the Preliminary Examination is not the proper place to raise the issue of illegally obtained evidence.

Rule 40 on "Commitment to Another District; Removal" makes clear that an arrested person is to be brought before a United States Magistrate or Federal judge rather than a state or local judicial officer, and that he shall be so taken without unnecessary delay. It also provides that the defendant shall be informed of the fact that he may avail himself of the provisions of Rule 20 on "Transfer from the District for Plea and Sentence," if applicable in the particular case.

Rule 41 on "Search and Seizure" provides that a search warrant may be obtained or issued upon the request of a Federal law enforcement officer or attorney for the Government. The title of its subdivision (b) is changed from "Grounds for Issuance" to "Property Which May be Seized With a Warrant" to make it conform more accurately to the content of the subdivision. It is also changed to modernize the language used to describe the property which may be seized with a search warrant and to take account of the holding in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and recent congressional action (18 U.S.C. 3103a) which authorize the issuance of a search warrant to search for items of solely evidential value.

The provision in subdivision (c) that the magistrate may examine the affiant or witnesses under oath is intended to assure him an opportunity to make a careful decision as to whether there is probable cause. It seems desirable to do this as an incident to the issuance of the warrant rather than having the issue raised only later on a motion to suppress the evidence. If testimony is taken it must be recorded,

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transcribed, and made part of the affidavit or affidavits. This is to insure an adequate basis for determining the sufficiency of the evidentiary grounds for the issuance of the search warrant if that question should later arise. The requirement that the warrant itself state the grounds for its issuance and the names of any affiants is eliminated as unnecessary paper work. There is no comparable requirement for an arrest warrant in Rule 4. A person who wishes to challenge the validity of a search warrant has access to the affidavits upon which the warrant is issued.

The former requirement that the warrant require that the search be conducted "forthwith" is changed to read "within a specified period of time not to exceed 10 days." The former rule contained an inconsistency between subdivision (c) requiring that the search be conducted "forthwith" and subdivision (d) requiring execution "within 10 days after its date." The amendment resolves this ambiguity and confers discretion upon the issuing magistrate to specify the time within which the search may be conducted to meet the needs of the particular case.

The rule is also changed to allow the magistrate to authorize a search at a time other than "daytime," where there is "reasonable" cause shown for doing so. To make clear what "daytime" means, the term is defined in subdivision (h) to mean the hours from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. according to local time.

Copies of the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure will be furnished as soon as available.

Manual changes follow.

10/3/72

MEMORANDUM 24-72

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(B) THEFT OF MILITARY ARMS AND AMMUNITION - THEFT OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY MATTERS -- Thefts of military weapons and armament throughout the United States are a matter of growing concern. Of particular interest are those instances involving burglaries of national and state guard armories which, when successful, usually result in the theft of numerous weapons including machine guns and semi-automatic weapons. It is recognized that these armories are generally in rural or remote areas with little or no physical security given them. In an effort to provide additional security to these armories, the U. S. Department of Justice is considering requesting that U. S. Attorneys solicit the cooperation of local law enforcement agencies to include these areas in their regular security patrols.

Our investigation of these offenses must be prompt, thorough, and afford no area for which criticism can be directed at the FBI. Upon receipt of a complaint, vigorous investigative and supervisory attention should be afforded each violation looking toward the identification and prosecution of the individuals responsible as well as the prompt recovery of the weapons stolen. This will help prevent these weapons from falling into the hands of individuals or organizations who can use them against law enforcement personnel, for assassinations, stockpiling purposes, and to commit other crimes of violence.

As you are aware, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms has increased responsibilities in firearms and explosives matters. Frequently, their investigations will "overlap" or fall within our investigative activity under Theft of Government Property, particularly when Government weapons or armament are involved. While the primary investigative jurisdiction over the enforcement of the National Firearms Act rests with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, you are reminded that the FBI has investigative jurisdiction over firearms violations stemming from our investigations in matters in which we have primary jurisdiction. All offices should insure that thefts of military weapons or armament are promptly and thoroughly investigated as Theft of Government Property cases. Any encroachment upon FBI jurisdiction is to be challenged and resolved without delay.

(Security pages attached)

10/3/72
MEMORANDUM 24-72

- 4 -

240811-20

Greenberg/Gray-3403

(C) NEED FOR PRIORITY ATTENTION TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, ORGANIZED CRIME AND DRUG ABUSE -- I have in the past publicly expressed concern over three basic problem areas in our society which must receive priority consideration as to the resources available to the Government. Certainly, drug abuse, organized crime and foreign-directed intelligence and domestic subversive elements within our Nation pose immediate, clear and present dangers to our society and Government. Of course it should be clearly recognized that we also have other vast responsibilities in addition to the ones mentioned above.

Although enforcement of Federal narcotics statutes is not within the ambit of this Bureau's primary responsibilities, as you are aware a national coordinator has been designated at FBIHQ with a local coordinator designated in each field office. Our liaison with all narcotics enforcement agencies has been stepped up and we are aggressively using our informant structure in a logical, productive way to contribute to our Nation's efforts against drug abuse.

Our efforts against organized crime must continue to receive priority attention due to the magnitude of that problem necessitating strong FBI action and superior performance.

The recent tragedy during the Olympic games, literally before the eyes of the world, amply demonstrates the terrorists' lack of concern for life as well as their willingness and capabilities to commit heinous crimes disguised as political acts. Within our society are elements who glorify guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Weatherman and related New Left terrorists and black extremists are of particular concern because they boldly proclaim an affinity for the third world communist revolutionary movement and, significantly, support such guerrilla movements. Their incongruous logic, obsession with revolution and known ability to engage in symbolic acts of destruction make them particularly dangerous to our free society when they continue to operate from a highly sophisticated underground apparatus.

Subversive elements in our society engage in a broad range of activity including deprivation of the rights of others by violent demonstrations and civil disobedience which frequently are also intended to force foreign policy decisions into a direction compatible with the overall

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objectives of the international communist revolutionary movement. They also engage in harassment of law enforcement and killing police officers because they represent the most visible evidence of the Government structure, and even outright terrorism by bombing is becoming common practice.

While the three problem areas mentioned above must receive priority attention, this in no way relieves you of your responsibilities with regard to other criminal violations, as well as in the field of civil rights. I recognize that no additional manpower will likely be available to handle our vast responsibilities. However, by careful streamlining of our operations, use of innovative and imaginative procedures, and careful utilization of the resources available, plus the esprit de corps that has so long been the FBI's trademark, we will accomplish this entire job that must be done.

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

10/3/72
MEMORANDUM 24-72

- 6 -

File on Administrative Changes

*"Review by all field offices of
equipment needs to combat
terrorist attacks"*

Greenberg/Gray-3406

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DATE 9/10/79 BY 6076 WAK/DB

*Not Sent
Material
7/10/80*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Millor
Re: Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW)
100-448092

ACTION:

Attached for approval are letters to Honorable
H. R. Haldeman at The White House and Acting Attorney General,
with copies to the Deputy Attorney General and Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Internal Security Division, containing above
information. (u)

- 2 -

Greenberg/Gray-3407

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-10-2009

1 - Mr. A. Rosen
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. D. W. Bowers

May 31, 1972

BY LIAISON

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
① - Mr. R. L. Pence

Honorable H. R.aldeman
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Baldeman:

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that an unidentified representative from the McGovern for President Committee was present at a regular meeting of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) in Los Angeles, California, on May 25, 1972. (e)

VVAW is a nationally known antiwar organization which, in recent months, has adopted an ever-increasing militant posture in conducting demonstrations. VVAW members have advocated civil disobedience and engaged in several seizures and blockades of important buildings and national monuments in the United States. For example, during December, 1971, VVAW members seized the Statue of Liberty, New York City; the Betsy Ross House, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; attempted to blockade the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas; and, the Lincoln Memorial, Washington, D. C. VVAW members have indicated the intention to engage in civil disobedience during the forthcoming political conventions in Florida. (e)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

RLP:djr
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

6076 ZLH/DB
9/10/79
CLASS. & EXT. BY
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 5/3/92

Greenberg/Gray-3408

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Honorable H. R. Haldeman

At the VVAW meeting in Los Angeles, the unidentified McGovern representative stated a station wagon would be leased by the McGovern Committee and furnished to the VVAW for the purpose of "barnstorming" college campuses between Los Angeles, California, and San Francisco, California, during the period from May 30 through June 2, 1972, to voice opposition to the Vietnam war. The source identified three members of the VVAW in Los Angeles who were to participate in the trip as

b6
b7C

(U) In addition, one unidentified VVAW member from San Diego, California, was to accompany the above individuals. (X)

This information is also being furnished to the Acting Attorney General. (U)

Sincerely yours,

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

NOTE:

b2
b7D

(U) Classified "~~Confidential~~" since unauthorized disclosure could be detrimental to national defense interests by compromising a source of continuing value. Los Angeles source is (X)

See memorandum R. L. Shackelford to Mr. E. S. Miller, captioned "Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW), IS - Revolutionary Activities," prepared by RLP:tlp, dated 5/31/72. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

240811-23

Greenberg/Gray-3409

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 - Mr. A. Rosen
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop

The Acting Attorney General

May 31, 1972

Acting Director, FBI

1 - Mr. D. W. Bowers
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. R. L. Pence

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST
THE WAR (VVAW)
INTERNAL SECURITY - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

(U) A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that an unidentified representative from the National War President Committee was present at a regular meeting of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) in Los Angeles, California, on May 29, 1972. (S)

(U) VVAW is a nationally known antiwar organization which, in recent months, has adopted an ever-increasing militant posture in conducting demonstrations. VVAW members have advocated civil disobedience and engaged in several seizures and blockades of important buildings and national monuments in the United States. For example, during December, 1971, VVAW members seized the Statue of Liberty, New York City; The Mayor Ross House, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; attempted to blockade the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas; and, the Lincoln Memorial, Washington, D. C. VVAW members have indicated the intention to engage in civil disobedience during the forthcoming political conventions in Florida. (S)

100-443032

RLP:djr
(12)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6076 WPA/128
9/10/79
CLASS. & EXT. BY
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 5/31/92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Acting Attorney General

At the VVAW meeting in Los Angeles, the unidentified McGovern representative stated a station wagon would be leased by the McGovern Committee and furnished to the VVAW for the purpose of "harrassing" college campuses between Los Angeles, California, and San Francisco, California, during the period from May 30 through June 2, 1972, to voice opposition to the Vietnam war. The source identified three members of the VVAW in Los Angeles who were to participate in the trip as [redacted] In

b6
b7C

(U) In addition, one unidentified VVAW member from San Diego, California, was to accompany the above individuals. (S)

This information is also being furnished to the Honorable H. R. Haldeman, Assistant to the President, at The White House. (U)

- 1 - The Deputy Attorney General
- 1 - Acting Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

NOTE:

(U) Classified "~~Confidential~~" since unauthorized disclosure could be detrimental to national defense interests by compromising a source of continuing value. Los Angeles source is [redacted] (S)

b2
b7D

See memorandum R. L. Shackelford to Mr. E. S. Miller, dated 5/31/72, captioned as above, prepared by RLP:tlp. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-10-2009

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 27 1972

TELETYPE

NR 028 LA ENCODE

958 PM NITEL 5-26-72 VLB

TO ACTING DIRECTOR (100-448092)

SACRAMENTO

SAN DIEGO

SAN FRANCISCO

FROM LOS ANGELES (100-77703) (P) 2P

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW), IS - REVOLUTIONARY
ACTIVITIES.

(U) INSTANT DATE SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFO IN PAST
ADVISED AN UNIDENTIFIED REPRESENTATIVE FROM MC GOVERN FOR PRESIDENT
COMMITTEE WAS PRESENT AT A REGULAR MEETING OF VVAW MAY TWENTY FIVE
LAST. (S)

VVAW IS AN ANTIWAR ORGANIZATION ORGANIZED IN SIXTY SEVEN
WITH HEADQUARTERS IN NEW YORK CITY. ITS PUBLISHED OBJECTIVE
IS "TO DEMAND IMMEDIATE SECESSION OF FIGHTING AND THE
WITHDRAWAL OF ALL AMERICAN TROOPS FROM INDO CHINA." (U)

(U) AT THIS MEETING, MC GOVERN REPRESENTATIVE STATED A STATION WAGON
WOULD BE LEASED BY MC GOVERN COMMITTEE AND FURNISHED TO VVAW FOR
PURPOSE OF BARNSTORMING COLLEGE CAMPUSES BETWEEN LOS ANGELES AND
SAN FRANCISCO DURING PERIOD OF MAY THIRTY THRU JUNE TWO NEXT. THE
PURPOSE OF SPEECHES IS TO VOICE OPPOSITION TO WAR IN VIETNAM. (S)
END PAGE ONE

REC'D 100
Adm. Data Section

Greenberg/Gray-3412

6076 7/24/100
9/10/79
CLASS. & EXT. BY
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 5/27/92

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE TWO

LA 198-77723

THREE MEMBERS OF VVAW FROM LOS ANGELES TENTATIVELY SELECTED TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS TRIP ARE: [REDACTED] PREVIOUSLY ARRESTED IN DEMO AT WASHINGTON, D. C., SPONSORED BY VVAW; [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] ONLY KNOWN ACTIVITY OF [REDACTED]

(U) AND [REDACTED] IS THAT OF VVAW. (S)

SOURCE FURTHER ADVISED ONE UNIDENTIFIED VVAW MEMBER FROM SAN DIEGO TO BE ACCOMPANYING ABOVE LISTED INDIVIDUALS. (S)

ADMINISTRATIVE:

LOS ANGELES WILL ADVISE BUREAU OF ALL PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS. (U)

(U) SOURCE FURNISHING INFO MAY TWENTY SIX INSTANT WAS [REDACTED]

b2
b7D

END

Greenberg/Gray-3413

cc - [Signature]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To insure the most effective use of the limited number of personnel available for liaison assignment, every effort should be made to avoid designation of mail for delivery "By Liaison" where such handling is not absolutely necessary. Mail will continue to be delivered to The White House "By Liaison" and mail for the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency should be similarly marked as this is picked up by courier from these agencies who visit the Liaison Section daily. Mail for other agencies should normally be designated for delivery by courier as the Bureau's efficient Courier Service makes visits twice daily to other U. S. agencies in the Washington area. Normally, mail should not be designated for delivery "By Liaison" unless some discussion with the addressee is necessary and requested.

In addition to domestic liaison matters, the new Liaison Section will coordinate the supervision of our offices abroad and will directly supervise Foreign Police Cooperation matters.

For the Acting Director
W. Mark Felt
Acting Associate Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-10-2009 BY 65179 dmh/baw/sbs

Greenberg/Gray-3414

11-22-72
MEMORANDUM 19-72

- 2 -

DO-6 OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Re: Liaison Section

1. Approved.
2. Section will not supervise offices overseas and in foreign countries.
3. Endeavor to assign to the Section SAs with previous Liaison Section experience. I will approve them, therefore let me have your recommendations.
4. I assume selections will be made from Division I personnel; in any event, if SA's are selected from staff at FBIHQ, no replacements are to be ordered in from the Field Divisions.
5. Agree with your addendum of 7-19-72.

MR. FELT ☒
MR. BAKER _____
MR. DATES _____
MR. BISHOP _____
MR. CALLAHAN _____
MR. CLEVELAND _____
MR. CONRAD _____
MR. DALBEY _____
MR. JENKINS _____
MR. MARSHALL _____
MR. MILLER, E.S. _____
MR. PONDER _____
MR. SOYARS _____
MR. WALTERS _____
TELE. ROOM _____
MR. KINLEY _____
MR. ARMSTRONG _____
MS. HERWIG _____
MRS. NEENAN _____

J. 9/3
8:32 P

Greenberg/Gray-3415

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-10-2009

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Felt
FROM : E. S. Miller
SUBJECT: LIAISON SECTION

DATE: 7/14/72

1-Mr. Felt
1-Mr. Donahoe
1-Mr. Miller
1-Mr. Decker

Felt _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Campbell _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

This memorandum is in response to Mr. Gray's comments concerning your memorandum to Mr. Kinley 6/30/72. Mr. Gray asked for a review of current and past liaison procedures.

The supervision of our foreign liaison representatives was not affected by the conversion in 7/70 of the Liaison Section to the Special Coordination Unit. That responsibility continues to be handled in the Special Coordination Unit in the same manner as it was handled in the former Liaison Section. This memorandum, therefore, is addressed to the question of the Bureau's domestic liaison operations.

Former Liaison Section

The objective of the Liaison Section was, through the development of high-level contacts in appropriate U. S. agencies, to insure that the Bureau's business with those agencies was accomplished promptly, effectively, economically, and with a minimum of jurisdictional or policy problems. By the establishment of effective liaison contacts, we sought to recognize and solve minor problems before they became major problems requiring protracted and expensive negotiations between the Bureau and other agencies.

Procedures under Liaison Section

The objectives cited above were achieved by placing seasoned Bureau representatives of broad experience in contact with officials at the highest levels of other agencies where the Bureau either needed help or had concurrent interests. In the former Liaison Section, ten Agents maintained liaison with approximately 81 U. S. agencies including major intelligence agencies, the military, other major departments, bureaus and commissions and many lesser agencies. They frequently visited the major agencies, developed a broad knowledge of

ESM:hc
(5) *hc*

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE 7.

CONTINUED - OVER

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DATE OF REVIEW 7/14/92
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E. S. Miller to Mr. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

their operations and established a close personal rapport with high-level officials in those agencies. For example, in matters of major importance the liaison Agent could make immediate personal contact with Cabinet officers, directors of bureaus and many other officials of the highest level. When our investigations required interviews of persons of this caliber, the interviews would be handled by the liaison Agents in order that the interviews could be accomplished without delay and with a minimum of inconvenience to the official involved. Many of these high-level contacts were the result of years of development by the Bureau liaison representatives and through them we were able to obtain assistance which might otherwise have been difficult or impossible to obtain. Some examples of this type of support are the following:

National Security Agency—One of the Bureau's secure telephone systems was provided and installed by this Agency at no cost to the Bureau, a savings of approximately \$150,000. Through high-level contacts in this Agency, we have also been able to secure the results of its technical research which might have been difficult or expensive to obtain through other sources.

Post Office—Our close association with the Chief Postal Inspector and his top officials has resulted in that agency providing support in some of our most delicate intelligence operations looking to the identification of illegal hostile intelligence activities in this country.

State Department—In addition to providing at no cost to the Bureau another secure telephone network and making available to the Bureau worldwide cable facilities of the State Department, our high-level contacts in this Department have on many occasions assisted in the speedy resolution of complicated investigative problems both in the criminal and security fields. An excellent example would be the support provided by the Passport Office of the State Department in identifying James Earl Ray as the assassin of Martin Luther King.

- 2 -

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Greenberg/Gray-3417

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

Military Agencies-The military intelligence agencies have consistently provided excellent support to the Bureau in both the security and criminal fields. Much of this is due to the high-level liaison contacts developed over the years with these agencies. In the Yablonsky murder case, the military provided, on very short notice at no cost to the Bureau, an expert diving team which was able to locate one of the weapons involved which was an essential piece of evidence in this crime. Likewise, the military has been able to provide a wealth of ~~deceptive~~ information to be used in our double agent operations directed against Soviet-bloc intelligence agencies. (S)

Immigration and Naturalization Service-

Through high-level contacts with this Service, we have been able to arrange with a minimum of complicated paper work the speedy deportation of persons entering the United States who are considered to be threats to the internal security, such as Arab terrorists sent to the United States on assassination missions.

In many other instances, through close established liaison, we were able to avoid the development of situations in other agencies which could have resulted in operational problems for the Bureau. Our liaison, for example, with the President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence and the Commission on Civil Rights provided advance information concerning possible publications or statements by those commissions which could have reflectd adversely on the Bureau.

Under these procedures, the Bureau liaison representative would be visiting the agencies assigned to him on a frequent basis so that officials of those agencies would be able to discuss potential policy problems with him before making them a matter of formal correspondence with the Bureau. In many of these situations, the Bureau liaison representative, being fully conversant with Bureau policies and procedures, would immediately resolve the question to the satisfaction of both the Bureau and the official of the other agency without the necessity of getting into expensive, drawn out, formal written negotiations between both agencies.

- 3 - CONTINUED - OVER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Greenberg/Gray-3418

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

Special Coordination Unit

Objectives of the Special Coordination Unit, while similar to those previously stated for the former Liaison Section, are necessarily less broad and are directed more towards facilitating the resolution of problems raised by other agencies than producing effective action by other agencies on behalf of the FBI.

Procedures under Special Coordination Unit

Under the current setup, two Agents assigned to the Special Coordination Unit are handling our domestic liaison work. One of these is assigned to liaison with The White House, the Vice President, and the National Security Council. He is backed up by the other Agent who also attends meetings of various intelligence committees and assists the Unit Chief in handling inquiries from other agencies doing business with the Bureau.

We have been able in our current system to carry on an effective liaison operation primarily because of the quality and number of high-level contacts which had been developed under the previous Liaison Section system. Although effective, this has really been a holding operation largely dependent upon the existing reservoir of well developed contacts. Due to transfers and retirements in the most important agencies with which we do business, our established contacts have been deteriorating so that we are approaching the point of diminishing returns. This situation could be reversed if we had sufficient man power to visit the more important agencies, renew old contacts and establish new ones.

Currently, with the exception of our liaison with The White House, the Vice President and the National Security Council, our liaison with other agencies is primarily dependent upon those agencies contacting the Special Coordination Unit either telephonically or in person.

- 4 -

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

Costs

In measuring the cost of a domestic liaison operation, the only measurable cost is the total salary for personnel involved. Liaison Agents are normally selected from among Supervisors of GS-15 caliber (\$25,583-\$33,260); that is, men who have the ability and experience required to handle a Unit Chief's job or a job of similar responsibility. Based on current median salaries, there is set out below a comparison of the annual salary cost of the former Liaison Section and the current Special Coordination Unit. In considering these figures, it should be recognized that the Section Chief and Number One Man in the former Liaison Section, and the Unit Chief in the present Special Coordination Unit devoted only part of their time to domestic liaison, and also supervised the coordination of our offices abroad and the investigation of the many "Foreign Police Cooperation" cases handled in the United States in reciprocity for the work done for us abroad. The former Liaison Section also handled other matters, now absorbed elsewhere, such as emergency planning and the Bureau's participation in the NATO Special Committee.

Former Liaison Section

1 - GS-16 Section Chief	- \$33,634
1 - GS-15 Number One Man	- 28,995
10 - GS-15 Liaison Agent positions	289,950
Total:	<u>\$352,579</u>

Special Coordination Unit

1 - GS-15 Unit Chief position	\$28,995
1 - GS-15 Liaison Agent	28,995
1 - GS-14 Supervisor	24,888
	<u>\$82,878</u>

If, as suggested, the current Special Coordination Unit were to be expanded to a liaison operation, the increased salary costs should be estimated at \$28,995 annually per additional Liaison Agent. Therefore, the proposed addition of three qualified Liaison Agents to the Unit would result in an increased annual expenditure of \$86,985.

We have previously cited examples of tangible monetary savings effected through liaison. In addition, there are considerable intangible savings which are difficult to measure

- 5 - CONTINUED - OVER

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Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

such as savings in reduced paper work, savings in man hours of consultation, savings in the elimination of unnecessary or duplicative investigative effort and, of overriding importance, the increasing of our operational effectiveness through the establishment of good will with other agencies. These savings offset to a considerable degree the increased salary expenditure.

Conclusion

Although we enjoy a strong operational relationship with other agencies, including the intelligence agencies, wherein in many instances we have face-to-face meetings at the desk level with counterparts in other agencies, we believe that from the overall standpoint the Bureau can profit from the assignment of three additional Liaison Agents to this work. We are not recommending that we enter into liaison functions as broadly as we were engaged in the past as we believe such an expenditure would not be justified. What we are recommending is the assignment of one-half the personnel which had previously been assigned to direct liaison functions at less than one-half the previous cost.

ACTION:

For information.

LFS
AJH

DEM

WVC

EM

mmw

(OVER...)

- 6 -

Greenberg/Gray-3421

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT 7-19-72 WMF:crj

I recommend re-establishment of a Liaison Section on the restricted basis outlined above. The Liaison Section should maintain smooth and continuing contact with top officials in the intelligence community and related departments. We would not change in any way very effective liaison maintained by other divisions with Congress, Budget Bureau, Civil Service Commission, Department of Transportation in connection with hijackings and security matters, etc. This action would eliminate any remnants of criticism concerning our liaison. We would set up strict guidelines and carefully select our personnel to insure that we would get the type of liaison outlined above. We would guard against it becoming a mail courier operation.

I recommend the re-establishment of the Liaison Section and the adding of three additional agents to implement this.

Cegee
Jth 9-3
8:22P

You will recall this originated with a series of suggestions by SAC Kunkel.

Yes, it did; however this matter I had under consideration at the inception. I was well aware of the disestablishment of the Liaison Section & the reasons therefore and had this matter on my list.

- 7 -

FBIHQ DIVISION VISITS

<u>DIVISION</u>	<u>DATE(S)</u>
5 - Domestic Intelligence	May 17, July 12, July 28, August 3, August 10, August 17, 1972; Jan. 30, 1973
8 - Crime Records	May 18, and October 4, 1972
3 - Administrative	June 27, 1972 and Feb. 14, 1973
6 - General Investigative	July 7, 1972
4 - Files and Communications	July 12, August 9, and Nov. 6, 1972
9 - Special Investigative	July 27, 1972
1 - Identification	October 3, 1972
2 - Training	July 13, Aug. 3, Aug. 10, Aug. 24, Oct. 3, Oct. 19, 1972; Jan. 16, Jan. 22, Jan. 30, Feb. 13, 1973
7 - Laboratory	October 27, 1972
11 - Legal Counsel	November 1, 1972
12 - Computer Systems	November 2, 1972
10 - Inspection	November 16, 1972
13 - Office of Planning and Evaluation	February 1, 1973

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/10/79 BY 6076 WMA/BB

(21) a

SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
	1	2	3 AR. 7:35 AM DEP. 6:45 PM	4 AR. 8:00 AM DEP. 7:15 PM	5 AR. 8:00 AM DEP. 6:00 PM POA TO CONN.	6 CONN.
7 CONN.	8 POA TO NEW HAVEN NEW HAVEN FIELD OFFICE VISIT POA TO WDC	9 AR. 8:00 AM DEP. 5:45 PM	10 AR. 7:35 AM DEP. 6:40 PM	11 AR. 7:30 AM DEP. 5:45 PM DRUG PROGRAM GREAT HALL, DoJ	12 8:45 AM PRESS INTERVIEW AT HOME AR. 9:30 AM 10:30 AM POA TO NYC 3:00 PM NEW YORK F.O. VISIT POA TO CONN.	13 CONN.
14 CONN.	15 POA TO BOSTON BOSTON F.O. VISIT POA TO WASHINGTON,	16 AR. 8:00 AM DEP. 6:45 PM	17 AR. 7:35 AM DEP. 6:35 PM	18 AR. 7:37 AM 4:15 PM POA TO NORFOLK	19 NORFOLK, VA. AM DOLPHIN SCHOLARSHIP FOUNDATION BOARD MEETING 2:00 PM LV. FOR CONN. VIA POA 12 MIDNIGHT AR. CONN.	20 CONN.
21 CONN. POA TO WASHINGTON, D.C.	22 AR. 7:55 AM DEP. 6:30 PM	23 7:30 AM BREAKFAST MTG. AR. 8:20 AM 10:30 AM LV. FOR QUANTICO RON QUANTICO	24 QUANTICO 3:00 PM LV. FOR WDC 4:00 PM AR. OFFICE DEP. 6:40 PM	25 12 NOON MAC TO MOBILE 2 PM MOBILE F.O. VISIT 7 PM SPEECH - CRIME CONTROL CONF. BILOXI RON BILOXI	26 8 AM LV. FOR NEW ORLEANS 9:30 AM NEW ORLEANS F.O. VISIT 12:25 PM LV. NEW ORLEANS VIA NA 2 PM HOUSTON F.O. VISIT RON HOUSTON	27 12:30 PM LUNCHEON MEETING RON HOUSTON
28 9:50 AM MAC TO WDC 1:30 PM AR. ANDREWS	29 HOLIDAY	30 AR. 7:30 AM DEP. 5:30 PM	31 AR. 7:30 AM DEP. 6:30 PM	Greenberg/Gray-3424		

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 9/10/79 BY 6076 WDH/RB

1972

JUNE

1972

SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
				1 AR. 7:33 AM	2 7:45 AM DENTIST 9:00 AM AR. OFFICE	3 CONN. 1:00 PM PARADE. INTERVIEW
4 CONN.	5 7:45 AM LV. RES. 8:30 AM MAC TO NEWARK 9:35 AM NEWARK F.O. VISIT 12 NOON MAC TO PHILA. 1:20 PM PHILA. F.O. VISIT 4:30 PM MAC TO WDC 5:15 PM AR. ANDREWS 6:30 PM RECPT. - FBI ACADEMY WAYFLOWER	6 AR. 7:33 AM DEP. 6:30 PM	7 7:45 AM DENTIST 8:45 AM AR. OFFICE DEP. 6:30 PM	8 AR. 8:05 AM DEP. 5:55 PM 7 PM BOYS CLUB DINNER SPEECH 11 PM LV. FOR RES.	9 AR. 7:35 AM DEP. 5:30 PM 6 PM RECPT. FOR [REDACTED] 6:45 PM RECPT. WH POLICE	10 7:10 AM AL TO CONN. b6 b7C
11 CONN.	12 7:30 AM LV. RES. 8:30 AM MAC TO DETROIT 10 AM DETROIT F.O. VISIT 12:15 PM MAC TO CHICAGO 1:30 PM CHICAGO F.O. VISIT 4:30 PM MAC TO WDC 7 PM AR. ANDREWS	13 AR. 7:35 AM DEP. 6:35 PM	14 AR. 7:35 AM DEP. 6:40 PM	15 AR. 7:25 AM DEP. 6:40 PM	16 8:45 AM LV. RES. 9:30 AM MAC TO L/A 2:30 PM L/A FIELD OFFICE VISIT 7 PM SPEECH - "GREAT ISSUES" RON LOS ANGELES	17 11 AM SPEECH - PEPPERDINE RON NEWPT BEACH, CALIF.
18 TO PALM SPRINGS RON PALM SPRINGS	19 10 AM SPEECH 11:50 AM W/A TO S.F. 2 PM SAN FRANCISCO F.O. VISIT RON SAN FRANCISCO	20 9 AM MAC TO SACRAMENTO 10 AM SACRAMENTO F.O. VISIT 12 NOON MAC TO WDC 8 PM AR. ANDREWS	21 AR. 7:35 AM DEP. 6:30 PM	22 AR. 7:35 AM DEP. 7:10 PM	23 AR. 7:40 AM DEP. 4:15 PM	24 AR. 10:30 A.I. DEP. 12:45 PM
25 WASHINGTON, D.C.	26 8:15 AM LV. RES. 9 AM MAC TO CLEVELAND 10:45 AM CLEVELAND F.O. VISIT 1 PM MAC TO CINCINNATI 2:30 PM CINCINNATI F.O. VISIT 4:30 PM MAC TO WDC 5:30 PM AR. ANDREWS	27 AR. 7:33 AM DEP. 6:40 PM	28 AR. 7:37 AM DEP. 6:20 PM FOR WH APPT. @ 6:30 PM	29 8:30 AM LV. RES. 9:45 AM UA TO SAN DIEGO 12:30 PM SAN DIEGO F.O. VISIT 3 PM PARADE INTERVIEW 5:30 PM RECPT. RON SAN DIEGO	30 11 AM PRESS 12 NOON SPEECH - EXCHANGE CLUB 2:15 PM USN TO PHOENIX 4 PM PHOENIX F.O. VISIT RON PHOENIX	

1972

JULY

1972

SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
						1 10 AM LV. PHOENIX VIA WAC 6:15 PM AR. ANDREWS
2 WASHINGTON, D.C.	3 AR. 7:55 AM DEP. 6:00 PM	4 7:45 AM LV. RES. 8:15 AM MAC TO PHILA. 9:30 AM JULY 4th SPEECH 12:15 PM LUNCHEON 2:40 PM MAC TO WDC 3:10 PM AR. ANDREWS	5 AR. 7:45 AM DEP. 6:40 PM	6 AR. 7:31 AM DEP. 5:40 PM 7 PM DINNER MEETING WITH READER'S DIGEST. 9:30 PM AR. RES.	7 AR. 7:35 AM DEP. 5:00 PM 6:15 PM AL TO CONN.	8 CONN.
9 CONN.	10 CONN.	11 8 AM LV. RES., CONN. 9:03 AM MAC TO IND. 10:30 AM INDIANAPOLIS F.O. VISIT 12:30 PM MAC TO MILWAUKEE 2 PM MILWAUKEE F.O. VISIT 7 PM SPEECH - NA RETRAINING SESSION 8:45 PM MAC TO WDC 11:20 PM AR. ANDREWS	12 AR. 8:50 AM DEP. 7:02 PM	13 AR. 7:32 AM DEP. 6:45 PM	14 AR. 7:33 AM DEP. 2:00 PM POA TO CONN.	15 CONN. POA. TO LOVELL, MASS. 7 PM SPEECH - LOWELL, MASS., RAFA POA TO STONINGTON
16 CONN.	17 CONN.	18 8 AM LV. RES., CONN. 9 AM MAC TO DENVER 12:15 PM DENVER F.O. VISIT 2:30 PM MAC TO LAS VEGAS 3:15 PM LAS VEGAS F.O. VISIT 7:30 PM SPEECH - ICPA RON LAS VEGAS	19 9 AM MAC TO OMAHA 2 PM OMAHA F.O. VISIT 4:45 PM MAC TO WDC 8:00 PM AR. ANDREWS	20 AR. 7:40 AM DEP. 6:45 PM	21 AR. 7:32 AM DEP. 5:20 PM 6:15 PM AL TO CONN.	22 CONN.
23/30 CONN.	24/31 24th 10 AM LV. RES. VIA POA 4:30 PM AR. WDC 31st CONN.	25 8:15 AM LV. RES. 9 AM MAC TO KNOXVILLE 10:45 AM KNOXVILLE F.O. VISIT 1:40 PM MAC TO ATLANTA 2:50 PM ATLANTA F.O. VISIT 5:00 PM MAC TO WDC 6:30 PM AR. ANDREWS	26 AR. 7:40 AM DEP. 6:55 PM	27 AR. 7:45 AM DEP. 6:40 PM	28 AR. 7:32 AM DEP. 5:15 PM 6:15 PM AL TO CONN.	29 CONN.

1972

Greenberg/Gray-3427

1972

SEPTEMBER

1972

SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
					1 AR. 7:37 AM 12:55 PM LV. OFFICE 1:25 PM MAC TO BUFFALO 2:50 PM BUFFALO F.O. VISIT 5:10 PM MAC TO N/L 6:15 PM AR. NEW LONDON RON	2 CONN.
3 CONN.	4 CONN.	5 8 AM LV. RES. CONN. 9 AM MAC TO ANCHORAGE 4:15 PM ANCHORAGE F.O. VISIT RON ANCHORAGE	6 8:30 AM LV. HOTEL 9:05 AM MAC TO SEATTLE 2:45 PM SEATTLE F.O. VISIT 5 PM MAC TO PORTLAND 5:40 PM AR. PORTLAND RON	7 8:15 AM PORTLAND F.O. VISIT 10:50 AM MAC TO SPOKANE NOON SPEECH - WASH. STATE BAR 2:45 PM MAC TO BUTTE 7:30 PM SPEECH - ROTARY CLUB, BUTTE RON	8 9 AM BUTTE F/O VISIT 11:15 AM MAC TO N/L 6:00 PM AR. NEW LONDON RON	9 CONN.
10 CONN.	11 CONN. 5:55 PM AL TO WDC	12 AR. 8:00 AM DEP. 6:15 PM	13 AR. 7:40 AM DEP. 6:45 PM	14 7:45 AM DENTIST 8:50 AM AR. OFFICE DEP. 6:40 PM	15 AR. 7:34 AM DEP. 5:15 PM 6:15 PM AL TO CONN. RON	16 CONN.
17 CONN.	18 AL TO WDC 9:55 AM AR. OFFICE 4:30 PM LV. FOR QUANTICO 6:00 PM SPEECH - POLICE COMM. RELATIONS 9:30 PM AR. RES.	19 8:30 AM LV. RES. 9:00 AM MAC TO K.C. 10:25 AM KANSAS CITY F.O. VISIT 1:30 PM MAC TO MEMPHIS 3 PM MEMPHIS F.O. VISIT 5:30 PM MAC TO WDC 8:15 PM AR. ANDREWS	20 AR. 7:34 AM DEP. 6:50 PM	21 AR. 7:34 AM 4 PM LV. OFFICE 5 PM RECPT. & SPEECH CHESTERTOWN, MD. 11 PM AR. RES.	22 AR. 7:30 AM 11:30 AM LV. OFFICE 12 NOON MAC TO DETROIT 12:30 PM LUNCHEON 7 PM SPEECH - MICH. STATE BAR 11:26 PM MAC TO PROV. 1:00 AM AR. PROV. 2 AM AR. RES. & RON	23 CONN.
24 CONN.	25 AL TO WDC 10 AM AR. OFFICE DEP. 7:00 PM	26 AR. 7:38 AM DEP. 6:45 PM	27 7:30 AM LV. RES. 8 AM MAC TO COLO. SPRINGS 10 AM NORAD 12:15 PM SPEECH - COLO. CORRECTIONAL ASSN. 2 PM MAC TO ALBUQUERQUE 3:15 PM ALBUQUERQUE F.O. VISIT RON	28 7:15 AM LV. HOTEL 7:40 AM MAC TO EL PASO 8:35 AM EL PASO F.O. VISIT 10 AM MAC TO SAN ANTONIO 1:45 PM SAN ANTONIO F.O. VISIT 4:40 PM MAC TO WDC 6:00 PM AR. ANDREWS	29 AR. 7:36 AM DEP. 5:16 PM 6:15 PM AL FLIGHT - CANCELLED	30 WASHINGTON, D.C.

1972

OCTOBER

1972

SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
1 WASHINGTON, D.C.	2 AR. 7:39 AM DEP. 6:45 PM	3 8 AM LV. RES. 9 AM QUANTICO 1:45 PM AR. OFFICE DEP. 6:10 PM	4 AR. 7:29 AM 3 PM LV. FOR QUANTICO 4-6 PM RECPT. FOR MILITARY	5 AR. 7:33 AM DEP. 5:15 PM 6:15 PM AL TO CONN. RON	6 CONN.	7 CONN.
8 CONN.	9 CONN. NOON SPEECH - UNITED FUND RON	10 7:30 AM LV. RES. CONN. 8:40 AM MAC TO OKLA. CITY NOON SPEECH - ROTARY CLUB 2 PM OKLA. CITY F.O. VISIT 4:30 PM MAC TO DALLAS 5:15 PM AR. DALLAS RON	11 9 AM DALLAS F.O. VISIT 11:55 AM MAC TO BIRMINGHAM 1:30 PM BIRMINGHAM F.O. VISIT 4:05 PM MAC TO WDC 6:40 PM AR. ANDREWS	12 7:45 AM DENTIST 9:15 AM AR. OFFICE DEP. 5:58 PM 8 PM DINNER	13 AR. 7:38 AM 10 AM LV. OFFICE 10:40 AM MAC TO CHICAGO 11:30 AM SPEECH - EXECUTIVES CLUB 2:20 PM MAC TO WDC 4:40 PM AR. ANDREWS 6:15 PM AL TO CONN. RON	14 CONN.
15 CONN.	16 8:30 AM LV. RES. 9:40 AM MAC TO SALT LAKE CITY 2:30 PM SALT LAKE CITY F.O. VISIT RON	17 9 AM MTG. WITH NORMON LEADERS 11 AM SPEECH, IACP 11:54 AM MAC TO WDC 5:20 PM AR. ANDREWS	18 AR. 7:40 AM DEP. 6:00 PM	19 8 AM LV. RES. 9 AM QUANTICO BRFG. 11:42 AM AR. OFFICE DEP. 6:55 PM	20 7:45 AM DENTIST 9:08 AM AR. OFFICE 4:00 PM LV. OFFICE 4:30 PM MAC TO HOT SPRINGS, VA. 7 PM SPEECH - BUSINESS COUNCIL RON	21 9:15 AM MAC TO WDC 10:15 AM A.L. ANDREWS 11:50 AM L.V. RES. 12:40 PM A. TO N/L RON CONN
22 CONN.	23 CONN.	24 8 AM LV. RES. 9:15 AM MAC TO TAMPA 1:45 PM TAMPA F.O. VISIT 4 PM MAC TO MIAMI RON	25 10:30 AM MIAMI F.O. VISIT 1 PM MAC TO JACKSONVILLE 2:30 PM JACKSONVILLE F.O. VISIT 4:50 PM MAC TO WDC 6:35 PM AR. ANDREWS	26 AR. 7:35 AM 9:20 AM LV. OFFICE 9:50 AM MAC TO NYC 11:45 AM SPEECH - ROTARY CLUB 3 PM MAC TO WDC 4:15 PM AR. ANDREWS DEP. 6:40 PM	27 AR. 7:31 AM DEP. 6:40 PM	28 WASHINGTON, D.C.
29 10:30 AM SPEECH - FBI COMMUNION BREAKFAST	30 7:30 AM LV. RES. 8 AM MAC TO RICHMOND 9 AM RICHMOND F.O. VISIT 11:30 AM MAC TO BALTIMORE 12:25 PM BALTIMORE F.O. VISIT 3 PM MAC TO SAN JUAN 7:20 PM AR. SAN JUAN, P.R. RON	31 1:30 PM SAN JUAN F.O. VISIT 4 PM MAC TO WDC 7:10 PM AR. ANDREWS				

1972

NOVEMBER

1972

SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
			1 AR, 8:00 AM DEP, 6:40 PM	2 AR, 8:00 AM DEP, 6:40 PM	3 AR, 8:00 AM 10:15 AM LV. OFFICE 10:45 AM MAC TO NYC 12:30 PM LUNCHEON-MTG. 3:10 PM LV. NYC VIA TRAIN 5:55 PM AR, N/L RON	4 CONN.
5 CONN. 4:56 PM AL TO WDC	6 AR, 7:55 AM DEP, 6:40 PM	7 AR, 7:32 AM DEP, 6:40 PM	8 7:45 AM DENTIST 9:05 AM AR. OFFICE 3:15 PM LV. OFFICE 3:50 PM MAC TO NEW ORLEANS 8 PM DINNER & RECPT. RON	9 8:30 AM SPEECH - EX-AGENTS SOCIETY 10:59 AM MAC TO HARTFORD 5:30 PM PRESS CONF. 6:00 PM RECPT. & SPEECH - 100 CLUB 10 PM POA TO RES. RON	10 CONN.	11 CONN.
12 CONN.	13 CONN. 8:50 PM AL TO WDC	14 7:45 AM DENTIST 9:05 AM AR. OFFICE 11:50 AM LV. OFFICE 12:20 PM MAC TO ST. LOUIS 1:40 PM ST. LOUIS F.O. VISIT 6 PM RECPT. & SPEECH - BACKSTOPPERS 10:43 PM MAC TO WDC 1:20 AM AR. ANDREWS	15 8:45 AM LV. RES. 10 AM SPEECH, QUANTICO DEP, 6:40 PM	16 AR, 7:33 AM DEP, 6:55 PM	17 AR, 7:45 AM DEP, 5:50 PM 6:30 PM RECPT. & SPEECH - GWU	18 AM POA TO CONN. RON
19 CONN. 3:30 PM HOSPITALIZED AT LAWRENCE & MEMORIAL HOSPITALS	20 HOSPITALIZED	21 HOSPITALIZED	22 HOSPITALIZED	23 HOSPITALIZED	24 HOSPITALIZED	25 HOSPITALIZED
26 SURGERY	27 HOSPITALIZED	28 HOSPITALIZED	29 HOSPITALIZED	30 HOSPITALIZED		

1972

DECEMBER

1972

SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
					1 HOSPITALIZED	2 HOSPITALIZED
3 RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL	4 RESIDENCE - STONINGTON, CONN.	5 RESIDENCE - STONINGTON, CONN.	6 RESIDENCE - STONINGTON, CONN.	7 RESIDENCE - STONINGTON, CONN.	8 RESIDENCE - STONINGTON, CONN.	9 CONN.
10 CONN.	11 4:56 PM AL TO WDC	12 KEY BISCAYNE, FLORIDA	13 KEY BISCAYNE, FLORIDA	14 KEY BISCAYNE, FLORIDA	15 KEY BISCAYNE, FLORIDA	16 FLORIDA
17 FLORIDA	18 KEY BISCAYNE, FLORIDA	19 KEY BISCAYNE, FLORIDA	20 KEY BISCAYNE, FLORIDA	21 KEY BISCAYNE, FLORIDA	22 POA TO CONN.	23 CONN.
24/31 CONN.	25 RESIDENCE - STONINGTON, CONN.	26 RESIDENCE - STONINGTON, CONN.	27 RESIDENCE - STONINGTON, CONN.	28 RESIDENCE - STONINGTON, CONN.	29 RESIDENCE - STONINGTON, CONN.	30 CONN.

1973

JANUARY

1973

SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
	1 11:30 AM LV. CONN. VIA POA 5:50 PM AR. WDC	2 AR. 7:55 AM DEP. 6:40 PM	3 AR. 7:55 AM DEP. 6:35 PM	4 AR. 7:55 AM DEP. 6:35 PM	5 AR. 7:55 AM DEP. 5:45 PM 7:45 PM DINNER CLARKSVILLE, MD.	6 WASHINGTON, D.C.
7 WASHINGTON, D.C.	8 AR. 7:40 AM NOON SAINTS & SINNERS LUNCHEON DEP. 6:25 PM	9 AR. 8:00 AM DEP. 5:15 PM 7:30 PM WASHINGTON PRESS CLUB DINNER	10 AR. 7:55 AM DEP. 6:30 PM	11 AR. 8:00 AM DEP. 6:15 PM	12 AR. 8:00 AM DEP. 5:45 PM 7:15 PM AL TO CONN.	13 CONN.
14 CONN.	15 AL TO WDC 1:00 PM AR. OFFICE DEP. 6:00 PM	16 8:00 AM LV. RES. 9:00 AM QUANTICO BRFG. 2:05 PM AR. OFFICE DEP. 6:25 PM	17 AR. 7:55 AM DEP. 6:25 PM	18 AR. 7:55 AM DEP. 6:15 PM	19 AR. 8:00 AM DEP. 5:20 PM	20 AR. 9:10 AM DEP. 5:15 PM
21 WASHINGTON, D.C.	22 8:00 AM LV. RES. 9:00 AM QUANTICO BRFG. 11:30 AM AR. OFFICE DEP. 6:00 PM	23 AR. 8:00 AM DEP. 6:10 PM	24 AR. 7:55 AM 12:45 PM SPEECH - NAVAL SHIP COMMAND DEP. 6:48 PM	25 HOLIDAY 10:15 AM SPEECH - CONF. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3:00 PM OMB	26 AR. 7:35 AM 10:05 AM MAC TO BANGOR NOON MAINE BAR ASSN. SPEECH 3:30 PM MAC TO N/L RON	27 CONN.
28 CONN.	29 AL TO WDC 2:15 PM AR. OFFICE DEP. 6:15 PM	30 8:00 AM LV. RES. 9:00 AM QUANTICO BRFG. 11:00 AM AR. OFFICE DEP. 6:05 PM 9:00 PM-12:30 AM ON STREETS W/WFO	31 AR. 7:32 AM DEP. 6:00 PM			

1973

FEBRUARY

1973

SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
				1 5:50 AM LV. RES. 6:45 AM USNA SPEECH ANNAPOLIS 8:35 AM AR. OFFICE DEP. 6:30 PM	2 AR. 7:40 AM DEP. 2:02 PM 3:00 PM AL TO PROV. RON CONN.	3 CONN.
4 CONN.	5 AL TO WDC 1:00 PM AR. OFFICE DEP. 6:10 PM	6 AR. 8:00 AM 12:30 PM HELMS LUNCHEON 2:30 PM SENATE YOUTH PRGM. DELEGATES DEP. 6:00 PM	7 AR. 8:00 AM DEP. 6:20 PM 7:00 PM CONG. NIGHT DINNER, SOCIETY OF FORMER AGENTS	8 AR. 7:28 AM DEP. 6:15 PM	9 AR. 8:00 AM DEP. 2:15 PM 3:00 PM AL TO PROV. RON CONN.	10 CONN.
11 CONN.	12 AL TO WDC 1:00 PM AR. OFFICE DEP. 6:15 PM	13 8:00 AM LV. RES. 9:00 AM QUANTICO BRFG. NOON AR. OFFICE DEP. 6:15 PM	14 AR. 7:30 AM 12:15 PM SPEECH - WAR COLLEGE WOMEN'S CLUB DEP. 6:15 PM	15 9 AM LV. RES. 9:30 AM MAC TO COLLEGE STATION TEXAS NOON SPEECH - TEXAS A & M 2:45 PM MAC TO WDC 6:15 PM AR. ANDREWS	16 AR. 7:30 AM 10:30 AM MAC TO MILWAUKEE NOON SPEECH - WISCONSIN STATE BAR 3:20 PM MAC TO WDC 5:50 PM AR. ANDREWS	17 9:00 AM AL TO CONN.
18 CONN.	19 HOLIDAY CONN. 4:56 PM AL TO WDC	20 AR. 8:00 AM DEP. 6:40 PM	21 AR. 8:00 AM DEP. 6:44 PM	22 8:45 AM LV. RES. 9:15 AM MAC TO BOSTON 1:05 PM MAC TO WDC 2:05 PM AR. ANDREWS 2:35 PM AR. OFFICE DEP. 6:00 PM	23 AR. 7:15 AM DEP. 12:20 PM 12:59 PM EA TO MIAMI	24 FLORIDA
25 FLORIDA	26 12 NOON LV. MIAMI VIA NA 2:55 PM AR. OFFICE	27	28			

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Greenberg/Gray-3434

FILE 21

7/6/77 B. H. Sullivan
11-12:15 PM then to lunch.

I. Hijackers - present

II. Rebuild the organization

(a) Select your most talented young men.
Problem is to identify them.

Page 35 to 45.

(b) Major weaknesses are here at FBI HQ -
Need stronger persons.

COMPUTERIZE PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS, possible or not, so
as to identify eligibles

III. Selections are based on power groups & cliques -

IV. Selection Board should represent from Field.

V. SAC's can contribute heavily

VI. Discipline - a sore, sore issue in this org. for years.
Disciplinary Board?

(a) Firm, national discipline - not that which
has been in effect in the FBI.

(b) Agents would welcome it; it is the discipline
of the workers - not that of management - it
is that of the Peer Group.

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6076 WGAH/ADB
CLASS. & EXT. BY 9/10/79
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 7/6/93
para marked otherwise

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(C) This is not a review board.

(d) Final decision is in the hands of the Director -

VII Agrees with my position on no disciplinary transfers.

VIII I think you are well on the way to doing a great job.

IX There is very good talent to do the black box job.

(S) Resurrect



b1



b6
b7C

(U)

(C)

Supervisor at WFO

Put him in charge.

X Lab. I'd look for a new head of the Lab.

Lacks imagination, vision & leadership
Too cautious -

Mr. Bill Baker of FIAB ^{superior} far behind the times.

There are able men in the Lab

But they are technicians

We need some new, young scientists

This is what we need.

We really need scientists

XI Lab is reluctant to work with CIA - we must pool our best lab brains in interest of nation.

Greenberg/Gray-3435


240811-20

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XII Thanks to Gen Haig I have a grant \$4.5 M to do

(S)



b1

(a) Do not divert any of these funds.

(b) Also they have the real technical know how to know how to do this?

WHO IS WORKING ON THIS?

(c) Are they working on this with CIA.

XIII Programs in D I D. Illegal Operations

What are our accomplishments

What are our failures? The illegal field

Our record in field of counterespionage is not good.

Each of those we have captured or those done by accident.

XIV There is serious evidence that our WFO is penetrated.

(U)




is a doubtful fellow. He just walked in & made an offer to help us & told us we had been infiltrated. (S)


b6
b7C

XV

(S)



(S)



men convinced [redacted] is planted.

b1
b6
b7C

(S)



are convinced " " " (S)

XVI I have talked to [redacted] his complaints that we are not giving him quality info & was giving our Agents fits. (S)

(U)

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

XVII Cover a certain phone booth at 7. & you will find a man who is giving ~~Soviet~~ info. He was [redacted] an Agent in WFO. We guigged him heavily & he denied everything. A few yrs. later we learned an Agent from WFO went to ~~Soviet~~ & offered to sell military secrets (S)

b6
b7C

XVIII We struck off an Agent & had him offer himself to ~~Soviet~~; we ran him against the ~~Soviet~~ - ~~Soviet~~ finally got from him his real name - that killed the operation. (S)

XIX Do you think NYFO is too big and should be broken up? It should be studied.
Break it up? Criminal Branch
Security Branch.

XX I rec. Swidung D I D into two Divisions
Intelligence - Espionage
Security Division
Break up into: Security Division.
Intelligence Division.
[redacted] is a very talented guy.

b6
b7C

XXI Legat Office - where should they be? In Admin. Bldg. or in D I D?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

XX"

I believe many of these ofcs are a waste of time.

Mex. London Canada Paris Hong Kong
Tokyo.

They are too many, far too many. Set up because
WH putting on pressure for quality intelligence.

Director Hoover sold to President Nixon this concept.

HOW VALUABLE IS THE INTELLIGENCE WE HAVE BEEN GATHERING
GOSSIP - OPINION - PLANTED INFO - OCCASIONALLY
A TID BIT OF SOME VALUE.

HAVE WE CORRELATED WITH CIA?

Greenberg/Gray-3438

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~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : L. Patrick Gray III
Acting Director

FROM : *DMA* Daniel M. Armstrong III

SUBJECT:

DATE: June 2, 1972

Felt _____
Mohr _____
Rosen _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Campbell _____
Casper _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Miller, C.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

This memorandum discusses those papers presented at the Princeton Conference which pertain to the domestic intelligence activities of the Bureau. The recommendations of the Conference on this subject are set forth at the end.

Although I have referred to some statements of Mr. Rehnquist in connection with the hearings before Senator Ervin's subcommittee which are responsive to fundamental questions concerning the constitutional authority of governmental intelligence collection practices, which would include the Bureau's domestic intelligence program, this memorandum focuses on what was said at Princeton.

I am advised that Mr. Miller has sent over to you a book on the files which were the subject of Jack Anderson's recent columns. The justification reportedly set forth in those materials for investigating the individuals mentioned by Jack Anderson should also be helpful in responding to the Princeton discussions. I have asked to see this book when you have completed your use of it in connection with your earlier request to me to consider the statutory authority for the internal security investigation and file maintenance programs.

The impending Supreme Court decisions in the national security wiretapping cases, and possibly in the case involving Army spying on civilians, will hopefully resolve some of the troublesome questions on the issues of the government's authority to protect internal security and permissible means for carrying out that responsibility.

Enclosure

DMA:nm

nm

Greenberg/Gray-3439

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in ADEX, however, it became apparent that we should list in ADEX only those individuals whose actions and conduct show that they represent an immediate threat to the national security, as opposed to those who represent merely a potential threat to the national security. (U)

Approval of this concept by the Acting Director resulted in ADEX listings to be reduced from 13,000 to slightly more than 3,000 names. Thus, ADEX today represents a hard core of individuals who are dedicated to the overthrow or destruction of the U. S. Government. (U)

- 3 -

Greenberg/Gray-3440

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 12, 1973

INDEXES MAINTAINED IN
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

The following is a list of indexes maintained in the Intelligence Division in connection with the operations and work of that Division:

1. Administrative Index - This is a listing of slightly more than 3,000 names of individuals who represent a hard core threat to the national security and who by their actions and conduct exhibited that they are dedicated to the overthrow or destruction of the U. S. Government. (U)

2. Security Index - While abolished as an active index, Division V stores the old index cards and uses them for reference purposes only. Security Index was an integral part of the Emergency Detention Program and was abolished when the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 was repealed in September, 1971. (U)

3. Electronic Surveillance Index - This is an index of past and present electronic surveillances for national security purposes. The index includes both telephone and microphone surveillances. It dates back to the early 1940's. It is filed alphabetically by field offices. Each card (or set of cards) is a complete record of requests, authorizations, reauthorizations, installation, and discontinuance of electronic surveillances in national security cases. (U)

4. Index of active and discontinued mail covers. (U)

5. Index of Extremist Informants. (U)

6. Index of National Security Informants (besides Extremist Informants). (U)

7. Automatic Data Processing (ADP) listing of all Al Fatah and suspected Al Fatah members in the United States, [REDACTED]

b1

(C)

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DATE OF REVIEW 3/12/93

Greenberg/Gray-3441

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b1

(C) 8. Special Indices on [redacted] Universities and Graduate Schools - This lists identity of ethnic [redacted] who have attended school on the mainland of [redacted] (X)

(U) 9. ADP listing of all communist bloc officials stationed in the United States. The index includes the ~~Soviet, Soviet-bloc, and Cuban~~ and ~~Chinese~~ are now being programmed in. The data includes basic background and specifics if the individual is a known or suspected intelligence officer and breaks down as to ~~KGB, GRU,~~ etc. (X)

- 2 -

Greenberg/Gray-3442

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DATE 03-10-2009

March 12, 1973

DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
TO THE WHITE HOUSE REGARDING
VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR IN
VIETNAM (VVAW), MAY, 1972

In the testimony of Professor John T. Elliff before the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 8, 1973, Elliff testified beginning on page 627 that Robert Lee Houston (according to an article by Walter Pincus in the New Republic, February 24, 1973) stated that he got information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation among other police forces. Elliff said that his (Houston's ?) attorney submitted for trial records (Watergate trial ?) several (memos ?) dated in May, 1972, shortly after Mr. Gray took over the FBI. He described a confidential memo dated May 30, 1972, on the Vietnam Veterans Against the War which began in the traditional form. (U)

Elliff said that the specific memorandum (dated May 30, 1972 ?) had apparently no relationship to the security of the Nixon campaign. It discussed instead the tie of the McGovern campaign to the JAW (VVAW ?) and had no relationship to any specific danger to the Nixon campaign. (U)

Mr. Gray has referred to Elliff's testimony and inquired "Is Pincus right? Did we furnish the info? Could this have been intelligence re the convention that is being mentioned?" (U)

1) Pincus is probably at least partly right with respect to the memo described as a May 30, 1972, memo regarding the VVAW and McGovern's tie to the VVAW. (U)

(U) By teletype (copy attached) the Los Angeles Office advised May 26, 1972, that a confidential source had advised that an unidentified representative from McGovern for President Committee was present at a regular meeting of VVAW, May 25, 1972. At this meeting the McGovern representative stated a station wagon would be leased by the McGovern Committee and furnished to VVAW for purpose of barnstorming college campuses between Los Angeles and San Francisco between May 30, 1972, and June 2, 1972. (e)

6076 ZUDH/DB
9/10/79
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DATE OF REVIEW 3/12/93

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(U) On receipt of this information, a memo was prepared (copy attached) with a letter to Mr. Haldeman at the White House and the Acting Attorney General (copy attached) setting forth the information along with an appropriate characterization of the VVAW having engaged in acts of civil disobedience and stating intent to engage in civil disobedience during the coming political conventions in Florida. (U)

Our records reveal that a copy of the incoming teletype was disseminated to the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice. (U)

Pincus's article (copy attached) correctly quoted from the letter to Haldeman and the Acting Attorney General. It was dated May 31, 1972, however, not May 30, 1972. (U)

The information was furnished to Haldeman as a part of the intelligence being furnished to the White House and Department concerning both political conventions in Miami. In this connection VVAW was involved in plots to engage in violence during the convention and prosecutive action was taken in this regard. (U)

With specific reference to dissemination of intelligence and security data to the White House, Mr. Dalbey, at Mr. Gray's request, prepared an informal memo dated July 24, 1972 (copy attached), which justifies dissemination of intelligence and security information to the White House, as opposed to criminal data. It would appear that based on Mr. Dalbey's memo, the May 31, 1972, memo was clearly the type of information which should be disseminated to the White House. (U)

Enclosures

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b6
b7c

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-10-2009

1 - Mr. A. Rosen
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. D. W. Bowers

Mr. E. S. Miller

5/31/72

R. L. Shackelford

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. R. L. Pence

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW)
INTERNAL SECURITY - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

PURPOSE:

To recommend attached letters be sent to Honorable H. R. Haldeman at The White House and Acting Attorney General advising that McGovern for President Committee is in contact with militant Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) and furnishing vehicle to VVAW for antiwar campaigning in California. (U)

BACKGROUND:

VVAW is major antiwar organization in U. S. today and has adopted ever-increasing militant approach to demonstrations. VVAW has recently advocated civil disobedience and has engaged in seizures and blockades of major buildings and national monuments, including Statue of Liberty, New York City; Eatsy Ross House, Philadelphia; Lincoln Memorial, Washington, D. C.; and Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin. VVAW members have expressed definite intention to engage in disruption during forthcoming political conventions. (U)

(U) Los Angeles informant has advised that an unidentified representative from McGovern for President Committee, which supports the campaign of Senator George McGovern (D, South Dakota) for President in 1972 election, attended a regular meeting of VVAW in Los Angeles on 5/25/72. At this meeting the McGovern representative stated that a station wagon would be leased by the McGovern Committee and furnished to VVAW for the purpose of "barnstorming" college campuses between Los Angeles and San Francisco during period 5/30 - 6/2/72 to voice opposition to Vietnam war. Informant identified three VVAW members from Los Angeles who will participate as [redacted] in addition, an unidentified VVAW member from San Diego to accompany these individuals. (U)

Enclosures

100-448092

RLP:tlp
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

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9/10/79
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DATE OF REVIEW 5/31/92

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240811-00
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5. Grave Admin. problems in taking it over
would have to 1st clean out the dead-
wood.

6. Natl. Police Force would be a charge levelled.

7. BND) is too small in size to do the job.
They spend a lot of money.
They lose with B's

8. Code words — A to indicate we not solve same
B " classification.

9. I don't want FBI to publish & claim solve
map

10. Many reasons for submitting reports;
isolate at the field level.

11. We have investigated BND) as

12. BND) Agent Am. Chi. misused \$10,000

13. BND) org. is just at a diff. level.

\$48 Am Frank Waikart

CR. — SEC FILES. — APPLICANT

SECRET FILES

POLITICAL DOSSIERS

Greenberg/Gray-3446

640811-28

Who decides what is to go in file?

The Agent receives info & sends in to FBI.

The Supervisor reviews & he is not going to exclude.

Access to Files

Also requested INO Supervision
Courier Service.

Name Checks are a big reason
for file.

WE file a good many Clippings from
Generated by SA's on case. Pertinent to
a case.

WRIGHT DALBY

Impress. for any law enforcement
Agency to enforce all laws.

Resurrection - does this appear to
be pertinent to FBI juris.

Investigative Files

77 File General File

91 File Bank Robbery

76 File Auto Theft

Main File

Cross Reference.

WE have a Correlative Unit to prepare
a Summary

2077

Abstract on everything I write
considered confidential as an
official of FBI.

Ed Miller

quote.

Anderson's activities - Dr. Anderson's

BPP

Opened case on

b6
b7C

at request of Dept to
deter. if his speeches
were in viol. of sedition
statute.

Bill Cleveland - We are required to search
newspaper clippings for Justice
(originated by Cleveland case)

Ed Miller -

WMA Rock Hudson File

We do not have a main case file on him

Info comes in news

Gratuitous or Solicited

If a man is a homo, he is a potential
security risk.

Al Rosen - WH Entertainment # of people & info
had an opinion which dictates a name check.

Dissemination of Info -

Rumor or Gossip

are not disseminated

Warren Commission forced us to disseminate.

L

93-118042

Ed Miller

Al Rosen - One other theory in judging
"leaves" in high places is that they are
subject to seductions

Discrimination & Distribution

TEB - Anderson's info based on info that
is not investigative report.

We disseminate to W.H.
S.S.
Dept 3.

AC R - Very low security at home.

JPM - Reports getting into court cases.
Garner's Report

Recommend that a hard line be
taken on

JPM - Most potent thing you could do
is to get an Official Secrets Act

Edm - Theft of Govt. prop - ^{b6}
^{b7C}
case.

9:53 AM - Cir Rao at present time.

Bill Soyars - discrimination occurs in field too.

10:21 AM - Begin

17

How Cut JOLIS.
WITHOUT HARMING FBI!

MAC ARMSTRONG

Envi Per.

240811-22

Greenberg/Gray-3451

Jurisdiction Dirge & Dalby

One of Western man's great problems is to protect himself with a police force yet not develop a force impacting adversely on his liberties.

Keep FBI as small as possible to do major job of land emp.

Every advantage in being small & hard hitting.

Then as we began to do a good job we began to get more jurisdiction.

I want to get rid of the jurisdiction that is not producing a profit for the Nation.

DEI does not produce a profit, but this is a function we have to keep.

Keep what we must keep in the national interest & cut down on it as far as possible.

Need views of operating farmers in preparation of legislation & in commenting.

Critics 1. Do we want to give up jurisdiction?
2. Effort to get change in Congr. is too much & not worth the candle.

3. We have been busy ^{other} & farmers have no investigative staff.

Buckwalter

Al Rosen Many of small items can be given

P.L.

Here is an organization
trying to cut back on
Juras.

Ch. 10 General Public doesn't
understand our Juras

Judges & Ct. & Reports

JPM - You would eliminate too many people
on the hill & would eliminate those
whom we merit,

Statistic Producing Offices - We are
said to be too interested in them.

(DD) - The more you proliferate the more
you create criticism

Your ideal position is to be small
& hard hitting.

JPM - CRG

Joe P - Oppose entry into Northeast -

William C - Atomic Energy, cases cut back
drastically

Mankours - on Civil Rights & Org. Crime cases -

(DD) - FBI TV program has become
the most popular - No case
there on migratory birds -

AM
BAR-
ASSN
CFEE

You might call together a group
to look into companies -

JT CONGR. CFEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

240811-23

1 Buck Waters

→ Can you give this Cite all
the info.

Why not segregate out the
ones you want of it give
to them at all.

(DD) Is the Cr. Law friends of FBI
overextended

(DD) We have to gamble

A. Either by Action
B. " by Inaction

Call him

Ed Miller - Congr. Inves. is inevitable

DDK - Say it are in a Fact-
Finding period.

Ed M. - Mr. Hoover's death did
not bring this on.

7:47 AM Don't go anywhere
for guidance

11:42 AM National Police Forces (P. 10/10)

Superintendent to Rm

GNO gave us a very good rpt.
They sent out their inspection

Work Folder in ex. Rm at NLR
7 in the field.

11:50 AM Joe Carpan Police Training

How many police depts are
restricted now

Quinn Tamm... IACP

12:47 PM Nick Callahan

We have found
qualifications for
clearance as one
field officer

Surplus in

Soft steps for all rising

SA's not to

for clearance

Meeting recruitment with EEO program

↳ To meet closely with Ofc of EEO Affairs

3200
applications
for SA position

We do have visitations; contact with leaders

STANDARD 5

PUNISHMENT

PUBLICATION

CFG - meet with Negro police officers

Black police groups in major metropolitan areas -

42 top major cities

3 or 4 negro agents from St. L. P.D.

Nat'l. Par. Assn.

Every member of Exec. Conf. would like to see more blacks. (Buck Walters)

We need Chinese candidates.

Ed M. - Can we tell him that if you recruit him

We contact all returning services.

WATF - Prospects are real there.

1st P discipline Nick Callahan

No chewing out. "Exact standards"

JPM - No disciplinary action w/o chance to explain matter. Ev. Emp. makes best efficiency report & goes into file.

disciplinary fines - Oppose, unless it is in a situation.

240811-28

Greenberg/Gray-3458

Feb 3

Tuff discipline,

Public expects it.

Get Cooper

I talk to clerks & agents re.

Standard of Perfection

Ed M

— Describe. Trs for

WCCPC

— Describe. Pde.

Uniformity

JAN

— Give you approval to polygraph

Personally, No!

ALP

— I think this polygraph could be
constructed as follows.

Material to be supplied to North African

Not up to spec.

Used disinformation on a person &

He was told it was a policy.

He admitted he was lying.

(DD)

75% accurate

1:48 PM

Grooming & Personal Appearance
Standards.

Mon CW WMF; Dick B; Joe P; Buck W.
10/2/72
4:12 PM to 5:32 PM

① WFO

or

IDENT

② #1 + #2 Ident
L Personnel
Training
Orientation

IDENT

Personnel

③ Ofc of Equal Employment Opportunity

④

Red Marks = instructions to Admin
on 10/2/72 to let
the ord go out

Greenberg/Gray-3460

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/10/79 BY 6076 WAH/AB

The scope and basis of FBI domestic intelligence data collection was the subject of a paper presented at the Princeton Conference by John T. Elliff, an Assistant Professor of Politics at Brandeis University.

Mr. Hoover's account of the origins of a domestic intelligence program in the late 1930's posed two questions for Dr. Elliff. First, how was the scope of the FBI assignment initially understood? Second, what was considered the legal basis for the mission?

His answer to the first question is that President Roosevelt's concept of "subversion" focused primarily on the activity of foreign agents whereas Mr. Hoover's concept included the purely domestic advocacy of revolutionary doctrine. Dr. Elliff suggests that the fact that the Fifth Column, which was an initial subject of the continuing intelligence operation requested by the President, was perceived as including not only foreign agents but also American citizens whose political beliefs might lead them to serve the interests of opposing nations, facilitated Mr. Hoover's construction of President Roosevelt's orders as giving the FBI greater authority than actually intended by the President.

As to the legal basis for the open-ended intelligence work, Dr. Elliff finds little doubt that this mission of the FBI is based mainly on Executive authorization rather than any explicit Congressional mandate, with the possible exception of intelligence for protecting the President, which seems to be authorized by 28 U.S.C. §533(2). This conclusion is fortified by the

-1-

Greenberg/Gray-3461

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/10/79 BY 6076 URMH/AB

fact that President Roosevelt in a statement on September 6, 1939, authorized FBI intelligence on "subversive activities" which, according to Dr. Elliff, encompassed matters outside the sphere of specific criminal statutes within FBI jurisdiction. He finds it unfortunate that the public statement of September 6, 1939, was later magnified into a definitive order by the FBI in view of the failure, at the time the statement was issued, to alert the White House to the fact that the activity authorized by the statement could only be justified on a theory of inherent executive power which had not been formally articulated.

Dr. Elliff divides the intelligence gathering of the Bureau, described by him as by far its most important function, into parts -- (1) security intelligence and (2) racial intelligence.

He traces the security intelligence mission from its development in the mid-1930's, covering foreign agents and domestic Communist and Fascist movements whose revolutionary ideologies and potential allegiance to powerful foreign governments made them appear threats to national security, until the present when its responsibilities, according to the author, include monitoring the entire range of groups who express their dissatisfaction through protest demonstrations.

He discusses various analytical tools such as the wartime "danger cards," the Attorney General's list, the Security Index and the computer printouts of the Justice Department's Interdivisional Intelligence Unit, which

the Bureau has either compiled itself or aided the Justice Department in putting together. He finds that the intelligence reports have justified these analytical methods and vice-versa and points to a constant danger in intelligence work that information overload may create so much "noise" that truly vital data is not perceived.

The Bureau's racial intelligence program is described as having started in the 1940's and as focusing at first on racist and anti-civil rights groups committed to preventing persons from exercising their civil rights. The urban riots, black militancy, civil unrest and new forms of violent protest of the 1960's have extended this program to include not only racist and anti-civil rights groups but also militant extremists who may resort to violence and the general climate of racial tension in specific cities. It was this later dimension which led to the inauguration of the "racial informant (ghetto)" program in early 1968, which is described in detail in the Media documents. Dr. Elliff concludes that racial intelligence coverage now rivals the security mission in the demands placed on FBI resources.

Although he intimates that state and local governments may be better equipped than a federal agency to do the job, Dr. Elliff says that some form of domestic intelligence will be needed as long as there are those who believe their ends justify any means including violence.

He suggests that a select Senate Committee should inquire into the FBI's activities not so much to discover illegality, but rather to evaluate for

the first time the Bureau's overall mandate against the norms of the Constitution. If fault is to be found, he would place it in those who gave responsibility to the FBI but failed to give it direction and control. Dr. Elliff questions whether Mr. Hoover's successor can, without outside scrutiny, maintain the highly objective and politically neutral system for efficiently processing, filing and retrieving data gathered by the Bureau, which system he regards as one of Mr. Hoover's greatest achievements.

He also recommends that legislation should be enacted so as to make it unnecessary for domestic intelligence to be based upon assertions of inherent Executive Power.

Other recommendations are for serious consideration to be given to (1) the possibility of separating foreign counter-espionage duties from domestic intelligence; (2) the need for a regulation to be issued by the Attorney General that would specify the circumstances under which the Domestic Intelligence Division could prepare and distribute Letterhead Memoranda; (3) the creation of a permanent domestic intelligence advisory council; (4) the utility and effectiveness of the domestic intelligence analysis sections in the Justice Department's Internal Security Division which may duplicate tasks already performed by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies; (5) authorizing the FBI to make recommendations and draw conclusions instead of merely finding facts; (6) more frequent contact by the Bureau with interested scholars and community leaders and (7) the proper scope of domestic intelligence.

In regard to this last item, the author wonders whether (a) federal employee security requires continuing intelligence about subversive or extremist groups, beyond individual background investigations; (b) the Executive needs to know to what extent outside political pressures for or against government policy are inspired or influenced by subversives or extremists and (c) federal intelligence significantly improves the capability of state and local law enforcement to handle demonstrations, civil disorders and other forms of political violence.

A second paper at the Princeton Conference on the FBI and the Bill of Rights, presented by Yale Law School Professor Thomas I. Emerson, dealt at length with the domestic intelligence aspects of the Bureau.

Professor Emerson's thesis is that the operations of the FBI in the name of internal security have had an adverse chilling effect on the openness of American Society, particularly on the system for the free expression of ideas protected by the First Amendment.

These operations are described as consisting of the collection of intelligence on all matters that could conceivably be relevant to the Bureau's expansive concept of "national security" which collection is unrelated to investigations of specific violations of statutes within its jurisdiction.

When the Bureau does concern itself with enforcement of these statutes, it is said to collect information relevant not only to violations that have occurred or are about to occur but also to violations which might occur

in the future. (Mr. Rehnquist's testimony before Senator Ervin's Subcommittee in March, 1971, does not make it clear that the Administration conceives its constitutional responsibility for the execution of the law to extend not merely to the prosecution of crime but to the prevention of it. In a separate speech which was made part of the record of the hearings of the Ervin Subcommittee, Mr. Rehnquist did indicate that "preventive" investigation should not extend beyond... investigative activity "reasonably related to the prevention of crime.") Professor Emerson concludes that the preventive approach to law enforcement leads to unlimited expansion of data collection.

Although he does not expressly call for limiting Bureau investigations tied to specific criminal statutes to investigations of violations that have occurred or are about to occur, Professor Emerson does urge that the FBI's general intelligence gathering, which is not tied to specific laws over which it has been given jurisdiction, should be stopped. He says, without documentation, the present excursions beyond the area of strict law enforcement were undertaken as a result of the Bureau's seizing upon oral statements of the President and stretching its statutory authority beyond recognition and by sheer usurpation.

Professor Emerson adds that this proposal, if accepted, would still give the Bureau room for activity that threatens individual rights because the present statutes in the area of national security and the loyalty programs of

the federal government are couched in sweeping language and embrace broad areas of conduct, including areas where political activity is taking place. He refers to the laws concerning espionage, sabotage, sedition (Smith Act), the Internal Security Act of 1950, alien deportation, crossing state lines with intent to blow up buildings, participate in or encourage a riot, etc.

Under the main loyalty-security program, established by executive orders, no person may obtain or hold a federal job unless his employment is "clearly consistent with the interests of national security," and the Attorney General maintains a list of organizations that are "totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive." Another speaker at Princeton, Professor Countryman of Harvard, whose topic was "history of the FBI," stated that the loyalty program has been expanded to cover the private employees of government contractors.

Professor Emerson's concern over the effect of intelligence activities on individual rights is accentuated by his findings as to the size of the Bureau (he refers to an estimate by the ACLU that 2000 agents are investigating political activities); its methods of investigation; its public relations campaigns; its political power; its influence on state and local police; its concentration of power in Mr. Hoover without external or internal checks; its ideology; its unrestricted scope of inquiry covering what is described as an extraordinarily broad spectrum with no criteria of relevancy; and its capacity for encouraging, or at least failing to prevent, leaks from its files.

He looks to the courts, in disposing of an increasing number of lawsuits brought by private citizens, to rely upon the First Amendment and developing doctrines of privacy to preclude the FBI (and presumably other intelligence gathering bodies) from

(1) Photographing peaceful demonstrators, recording license numbers of persons attending a meeting, ostentatious surveillance of a public gathering, or similar blanket collection of data on persons not engaged in criminal activities.

(2) Compiling dossiers of political intelligence upon persons who are not charged with or reasonably suspected of a specific violation of Federal law, or who are not candidates for Federal office.

(3) Making investigations or maintaining political surveillance of organizations or groups in the absence of a charge of, or reason to suspect, a violation of Federal law, or carrying such investigation beyond that necessary to dispose of the violation issue.

(4) Disclosing material from any dossier or otherwise except for specific law enforcement purposes.

(5) Conducting investigations or other activities in such a way as to constitute political harassment of the subject, not related to strict law enforcement functions.

(6) Engaging in political action or expression not directly related to the strict performance of its law enforcement functions.

With respect to possible limits on the use of informants, Professor Emerson, while professing uncertainty as to how the courts will respond to arguments based upon a right of privacy and rights under the First and Fourth Amendments, finds it reasonable to conclude that the Bureau will be permitted to use informers only in connection with specific violations of federal laws and not for the collection of general intelligence data or for information relevant only to the prevention of events that have not yet taken place.

Even where informants are permitted, Professor Emerson envisions that the day will come when a warrant will generally be required before the government can employ an informant and the government will be required to make a showing of "probable cause" and to describe particularly the area of the informer's operations and the kind of information he is to obtain.

In addition to calling for greater control over the Bureau by the President, the Attorney General and the Congress, Professor Emerson advocates the creation of a Board of Overseers who will have access to all Bureau records and activities and an Ombudsman who will have authority to receive and investigate citizen complaints, access to materials, power to obtain information necessary to his inquiries and authority to recommend remedial action.

(Senator Ervin appears to agree with Professor Emerson at least to the extent his attack upon the domestic intelligence program alleges a violation

of First Amendment rights. -Mr. Rehnquist, on the other hand, argued before Senator Ervin's subcommittee that information gathering even where unauthorized, which is accompanied by no threat of compulsion and when no use has been made of the information in order to seek imposition of any legal sanction on a person, does not violate the First Amendment. He predicted the Supreme Court would not broaden previous interpretations of the First Amendment to include a prohibition or circumscription of the mere collection of information unaccompanied by either an attempt to compel disclosure or to impose criminal or other sanctions on the basis of the information obtained.)

The practices of the FBI with respect to the use of informants for political intelligence gathering, which practices were the subject of some of Professor Emerson's concerns and recommendations, were discussed in more detail by another participant at the Princeton Conference, Frank J. Donner.

Mr. Donner stated that the use of informers is by far the most intensive and wide-spread technique for collecting political information. He alleged that "a network of FBI political informers girdles the entire country." Bureau policy and practice with regard to these informers is said to be completely autonomous, which autonomy gives the Bureau and Mr. Hoover "such unique repressive powers."

Mr. Donner contends that the mission of American political intelligence is to perpetuate the "red menace" myth that the country is under a permanent threat of internal subversion, and he spends much of his time at Princeton in a bitter personal attack against Mr. Hoover.

His argument is that a surveillance system operates as a serious restraint on the freedom of an individual who suspects that his political activities are under surveillance, and he believes that this restraint is exactly what the Bureau hopes to achieve by engaging in its intelligence activities which are overwhelmingly directed against the political left.

He discusses in detail the procedures whereby informants are recruited by FBI agents with special attention being devoted to the utilization of students on college campuses to spy on their fellow students.

Quoting a Biblical verse that "the talebearer shall defile his own soul, and be hated by all," Mr. Donner goes on to say that it would be a psychological miracle if a reasonably normal person became an informer without suffering profound guilt feelings, which cause him to distort and fantasize the target's conduct. He suggests that only money could cause a person to degrade himself by becoming an informer.

He cites the example of David R. Sannes in Seattle, whose charges appeared in the Washington Post and New York Times on June 1, 1972, as an illustration of how the informer system invites abuse. Sannes has charged

that the FBI, with the complicity of the United States Attorney, instructed him to allow a bombing to occur and to see to it that the man who set the bomb died in a booby-trapped explosion.

Mr. Donner's final thought is that if the country continues to corrupt and bribe its youth, blacks, professors, students and others to betray friends and associates, it will become the kind of Judas society made familiar by totalitarianism.

Although each speaker was free to make individual recommendations, the proposals of the Princeton Conference are contained in the final chapter of the book Investigating The FBI to be published in the winter of 1972. The recommendations directly relevant to domestic intelligence are as follows:

(1) Counter-espionage and intelligence functions should be separated from routine criminal law enforcement duties since each requires widely different backgrounds and training.

(2) There should be further study of the FBI's activities in the loyalty-security area. What are the FBI's responsibilities here, what definitions and standards does it work under? How has the Bureau's activities contributed to a national paranoia about a growing Communist menace, on the one hand, and about a growing secret police, on the other?

(3) The following suggestions were intended to make the Bureau more responsive to democratic control: (a) Establish a Board of Overseers, composed of public and private persons, to review Bureau policy-making, guard

against threats to civil liberties, and keep the public informed; (b) appoint a Bureau Ombudsman to respond to claims of abuse or denial of rights by individual citizens; (c) limit the term of the Director of the FBI.

(4) The FBI's intelligence gathering powers should be defined in terms of the enforcement of the criminal law and investigation of its violation. This limitation should apply to accumulation of dossiers, infiltration of organizations by undercover agents, and electronic surveillance. In each case, the test should be constitutional standards under the Fourth Amendment.

(5) Generally, citizens should have a right to see and challenge all information collected about them, and there should be rational guidelines for purging outdated or misleading information in FBI files.

(6) Invasions of privacy accompanied by the use of undercover agents or electronic equipment should require court warrants based on affidavits showing probable cause that a crime has been or will be committed.

(7) Either the Bureau Director should be prohibited from propagating a political ideology in books and articles or, if this type of restraint is undesirable, the President should appoint, and the Senate confirm, a Director only if he is sensitive to the problems raised by such propagation.

(8) There should be established a blue-ribbon citizens' commission to examine thoroughly Bureau policy and activity, especially domestic and foreign intelligence. It should have access to all Bureau information and responsibility to develop recommendations for reform.

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DATE 03-10-2009

5/10/77

CW M.F. & E.M.

SF

P.D.

① Gallagher - newspapers

S.F.

② Anderson columns re sec. lbr.

③ Mil. & Travel — Legislation? — Cost?

④ Personnel involving key changes — WMF handled for JEH.

[redacted] in Butte: down for 3 out of 4 of his categories.

EXEC. CONF.

→ Statistical Categories

EXEC. CONF.

→ Weight Standards

b6
b7C

⑤ Mail -

⑥ Inspection of Field C's. + Inspection of SOG Divs.

9:35 AM

Briefing by Mr. Muller

D. Cont. July 10-14

Will draw for bus power & fuel

R. Cont. Aug 21-24

5/6 - Flu Peace Re. Evaluation met. Decided being hits will be ripe on platform etc, only 10,000 will appear, but have 50,000 at Reg Cont. (this their plan).

Miami is better positioned in all respects to handle conventions - LEAA dollars in amt of \$600,000 have been paid in.

Cuba end act as a deterrent. EMK is trying to woo Cubans. They are right wingers. We have excell. coverage in Cuban env. Impress. at this point to measure rather convention in its degree of potential change.

L. [redacted] has splintered off from RLP & is forming two new groups. Activists must put this together in May or June

CUBANS
in FBI


b6
b7C

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para marked otherwise u

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(U)

Last Sept. we began pointing toward Rep. Gov.
We had 22 top informants in or desig. rated to go to S.D.
(in Hq. of S.D.) Convent. (Cte)

This Convent. Cte is to go to Miami.

We can't send 8% to Miami.

For D. Convent we have lined up 4%.

We will have excell. live informant
coverage at the Convent.

We have over 22
informants in the
security field; 5
these 8% are kept
on the Rep. Convent.

WE HAVE A LOT OF WORK TO DO IN THE FIELD TO GET TO

INFORMANT COVERAGE

WE HAVE MOVED OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES
UP TO APRIL & MAY. THE NAME OF THE GAME IS REVOLUTION.

VN VETS ARE VERY ANTI GOVT AND TERRORISTIC
OUTWARDLY POLITICAL GROUPS SHELTERING TERRORISTS
& REVOLUTIONARIES.

1. S/S; Attorney Gen.; INS; Customs; State.

2. Local Authority is Intell. Coordinator for the Convent area.
(Dom. Intell. Div. furnishes input.) 95% of load is ours -
Intell. Eval. Cte of Df is under ISD
Two of our men assigned on loan.

3. Quickest way to tell this story is say I need 65 more.

Greenberg/Gray-3475

240811-50
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7c

①



Pers. of SA

Extortion Problem

Can we get news media not to respond.

He threatens to blow 6 a/c, 5 of ours & 1 of
another carrier.

Greenberg/Gray-3476

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

5/11/72
9 to 10A

(W) WMF & E Miller

Greenberg/Gray-3477

WMF 1. Edne Holmes - Dfs mgr. - returning

WMF 2. SAC Moran

WMF 3 Budget.

WMF 4 Women

EM
CONF

5. ~~Sec~~ Espionage - have developed that source we have ever had.

(S) Discussed delivery of info to [redacted] b1

Discussion is FBI's

(U) (S)

(S) [redacted] meets LFG 5/17 at 10 AM b1

(S) [redacted] " [redacted] 5/16.

No dec. w/o approval of LFG; Thorely brief.

6. Convention coverage - we have it under control

Extremist demonstrations (JWD) TET WMF

We are flooding Dave Wilson with our info.

UPI machine installed in our ofc.

We give them info that is believable - The Facts

What is read in newspapers is not always believable.

We have squads in every city. ("mod" - The Beard)

~~XXXXXX~~ We were not sensitive to their problem; and as to their

need for news - Immed. after speech we sent out a teletype to

SAC. Hold this in abeyance.

Miami Beach represents a prob to demonstration; must cross causeway; have no logistic facilities in M.B.; ident. cards given to persons who enter M.B.; (Ed; check it out.)

LEAA gave MB grant of \$400,000. State run organization has been meeting regularly.

CLASS. & EXT. BY

REASON-FCIM II

DATE OF REVIEW

6076 WMA/208
9/10/92
1-2-2-2-3
5/11/92
para marked others U

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

7. N & S causeways into DCB.

WMF

8. Would it help to loosen up on payments to informants?
Informants are happy to int. work.
Tech. approacher " " "

CPG

9. I just believe we have young birds out there who would help.

WMF

10. Points out risks -

EM

11. Relying on live informants

Tech. cov. d. H. to come by due to today's world.

What does this mean?

We would have considerably more wiretaps, microphones,
mail covers. 79 wiretaps on now; 8 are in down
field

I could use 65 wiretaps
33 microphones
70 mail covers

} in down
field

All could possibly be co-ordination oriented

Greenberg/Gray-3478

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Nyt
Fri 6/16/72

Frank, Kent, Ky. June 15

The proposed amendment to the U.S. Const. guaranteeing equal rights to both sexes reached the halfway point in its progress toward ratification today when Ky. became the 19th state to approve it. A total of 38 states must ratify the amendment before it becomes part of the Constitution. Two states have rejected ratification.

Mon

6-19-72

6:36 AM TCT WMF from Palm Springs.

FBI Op connected me with WFO; tweek.

Finally told him to have WMF call me direct.

He called just shortly after I left to go to Mass.

Mon

6-19-72

7:32 AM TCF ROK

Sometime today or possibly tomorrow ROK is going to want to talk to me... ~~is~~ Is there anyone there who can come to see me today this PM? Yes WMF.

Mon

6-19-72

7:35 AM TCT

b6
b7C

10:00 AM

9:00 AM Opening Ceremony

9:30 AM AG Younger

9:50 AM

10:00 AM

LPG III

Break

b6
b7C

Mon

6-19-72

8:00 AM TCF WMF

We do not have too much this AM

I have a memo. to HRH & to ROK.

Reads memo

Approx. 12:30 AM 6/17/72. 5 arrested in office.

Why?

31081

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DATE 9/10/79 BY 6076 UAH/LSB

Had in their possession. Burglary tools, & car shopping, eg.

Opened panels.

Viol 9) C
Code

All charged w/ burglary

7 Held in lieu of \$50,000 bail

Michael " " 30,000

Interception
and
Dissemination

McNees on them

Background

Chk of E. Howard Hunt #6 ³⁰

Hunt employed by CIA to 4/70

We conducted an invs. for W.H. in 1971
for a sensitive post some 9 mos. ago.

[redacted] advised FBI he rec'd a
call at 3 AM from a person he refused to
identify

Chap 19 18 USC ²⁵¹¹ 2512
Title 18 Wire Interception & Interception
of Electronic Communications

FBI Invs. of

Interception of Communications

stat. is continuing

No. He not read.

What do you think of our conducting a sweep of
Demo Hqs for other services. Not yet; can hold for 24 or 48
hrs but it is a normal investigative technique.

On the front page here this AM.

A collateral piece on page 7 "Experts Keep Scorn
on Bungled Capers at Demo Nat'l Hq."

Our lab says this is sophisticated equipment

Recovered bullet from [redacted]; can make no positive
ident. on this bullet - probably from

b6
b7C

USA going to G.J.



not handed

b6
b7C

Plamondon Case:

S. Ct. outlawed wire tap of Domestic Subversives

- (1) Prior judicial approval required for type of surveillance
- (2) Where Govt illegally eavesdrops, it must turn over evi. to def
- (3) Indiv. rt. of privacy need no longer yield to Govt's rt. to preserve itself
- (4) In '67 S. Ct. found ^{Customs dropping} ~~Customs~~ w/o C.P. open. Violated 4th A. but said permissible in for. threats - R.N. took position that this was applicable to domestic threats -

Discuss with
RGK the cancellation
of the Domestic taps
& let him announce
D.J. to give FBI
written instructions

8 Domestic
Taps?

Gave WMF instructions as to how to handle the addressing
of the memo; meet 1st with RGK & brief him on facts
then give him my views re the overall approach to
invest. W/G case - no holds barred.
WMF not sure of exact no.

Chap 119 Title 18 USC

- 15.1.1. ✓ Interception & Disclosure Prohibited
- 15.1.2. ✓ Info. Relating to ^{Foreign} ~~Foreign~~ ^{Foreign} ~~Foreign~~ " "
13. Confiscation -
14. Immunity -
15. Prohibition of Use as Evi.
16. Authorization of Use & Wiretap
17. " & Disclosure
18. Procedure
19. Rpts

8:38 AM

20

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 03-10-2009

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

EX-218

Pondar :-

1. In 1966 missing any glasses? They will be at Portland
2. JTA mty - training for crews
Bass - Inter. of Pres. to threat by asking
3. Los Angeles - inspectors are at Sacramento.
- send 1 to Los Angeles
- confront Grogg with allegations
- take sworn statement from him
- no question that installation was prohibited by Bu Regs
- tapes are Govt. prop.
4. Black September incident in Munich. We have a follow up on this
b1 (C) [redacted] mail
they had info Al Fatah would
try an attack on E. airport in CTS
DIJ wants to apply for tech. on
b6 b7C [redacted] working with terrorism
(U) We have this also from [redacted]
[redacted] 8/19.
5. Pres. is apptg. a Comm'n to look into State betters + Off Track Betting
W.H. sent note to you to submit names of recently retired top FBI Officers
+ former agents who have experience in this field

Greenberg/Gray-3482

6076 WQH/DB
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DATE OF REVIEW 9/6/92
para marked others u

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7c

6. Portland Oregonian article re U.R.
7. Jean Westwood told press some men were in East work. Trying to bring down Hq. - she said she gave box to Edw. Bennett. W'mo - Edmo denies it; says he knows nothing of it.
8. We have 1 female applicant in next session of NA; a Capt. from N&C P.D.; have another from a police officer female - Detroit; a Sergeant from Detroit P.D. - 1 PG - go from 1st tier - hold 2d until next class.
9. I have the brief of - no need to return

Greenberg/Gray-3483

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

35- A Portland Thursday 9-7-72 TCT: Henry Peterson

1. I've just been talking to ROK
2. USA says crime committed by terrorists. 5 to 7 people in Army uniforms. - 8 killed & 7 wounded
3. Hiding out in a bush stronghold in St Croix
4. CG has made available a helicopter & USM S has made available bullet proof vests
5. USA will rpt in to us daily. Gov. Evans has a very difficult problem.
6. Very dangerous
7. LPG - Army that given to us by troops, US Marines
8. We think Local Constabulary guided by us people can do the job.
9. Our juris. auth. is pretty clear. Deprivation of rights.

People in a plush resort on St. Croix (Refugee camp?) who's killed.

Greenberg/Gray-3484

240811-20

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Spillover from the Watergate Misusing the FBI

by Walter Pincus

The Federal Bureau of Investigation passed along confidential information on antiwar groups and activities to the Committee to Re-elect the President during the past campaign, according to sworn testimony and exhibits presented at the recently completed trial of the five men caught bugging Democratic Party headquarters in the Watergate office building in Washington. A former assistant FBI director, who served under J. Edgar Hoover, termed the giving of bureau information directly to a political organization "improper" and something "unheard of" during the years that he was at the agency. Though it is possible the passing of information began before Hoover died last May, another former top Hoover aide, now retired, denies that it did. He added that proof of such a distribution of FBI material would be another sign of partisan politicizing of the bureau since the appointment of J. Patrick Gray III as acting director.

Gray's office spokesman, when specifically asked about giving information to the Nixon reelection committee, said "no comment." Three days earlier, when the question was first put, the spokesman—before checking—said he was almost certain no such activity had taken place.

The passing of information to the President's reelection organization is one more item to be looked into by the Senate Judiciary Committee if Gray—or any other political figure—is named to permanently succeed Hoover as FBI director. For the partisan political tilt of the FBI over the past nine months became predictable when the supposedly nonpartisan national police apparatus was turned over during a campaign year to an individual whose main claim to the job was his political links to the President. Those links became critical little more than a month later when the President's own staff and campaign organization were connected to the Watergate bugging and, later, to sabotage directed against Democratic candidates.

Gray's permanent appointment to be Hoover's successor, which once was promised for the day after Nixon's reelection, has yet to take place. The White House is not acknowledging any second thoughts, but the list of difficult questions that would be raised by a Gray appointment grows longer.

Giving information to the President's reelection committee. During the Watergate trial Robert Odle, who served as administration director for the reelection group, testified he hired James McCord, Jr., (one of

those convicted at the trial) to serve as the organization's security chief. McCord, who had worked for the FBI and CIA, was a part-time committee consultant in late 1971 and became full-time in January 1972. In describing McCord's function in preparing security measures for the committee's offices and speakers, Odle said McCord was "plugged in" to the FBI as well as the Secret Service. The "plugged in" to the bureau aspect was developed during McCord's brief defense. One of his former assistants on the Nixon committee, Robert Lee Houston, was asked to describe his duties under McCord's supervision. "Part of my instructions were to receive and record information from outside police sources," Houston testified. What sources he was asked? "The information I got came from the Federal Bureau, the Internal Security Division [of the Justice Department]" and various police forces. McCord's attorney then submitted for the trial record a handful of reports McCord filed with his superiors, including several dated in May 1972, shortly after Gray took over the FBI. The reports selected, apparently, from a hundred or more McCord wrote, focused on the potential for violence against Nixon headquarters facilities. But a "confidential" memo dated 30 May 1972 on the Vietnam Veterans Against the War began in traditional FBI summary form: "A confidential source of known reliability has advised this date that an unidentified representative of the McGovern for President Committee attended a meeting of VVAW recently and advised that the McGovern Committee is leasing a station wagon for the VVAW" to use for campaigning purposes. The memo also carried a short summary of the background of the VVAW—again the type of material found in an FBI summary. Houston, who still works for the reelection committee, would not comment further on his testimony. Another reelection committee official, who was in direct contact with the security operation during the campaign, confirmed that McCord regularly dealt with an FBI agent who gave the committee information on groups or individuals who at some point might pose a problem to the Nixon campaign organization.

It is not difficult to rationalize the reelection committee's relationship with the Secret Service—the McCord memos show that discussions took place on setting up identification systems for the Republican convention. As for Justice's Internal Security Division, it has acknowledged that information relating to the

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convention, and the possibilities for violence there, was given to the Republicans and the Democrats as well. But there is no such reason or known precedent for the bureau to provide the Nixon committee with any confidential information.

The conduct of the Watergate investigation by the FBI. It has never been made clear exactly who ordered the FBI into the Watergate case and when. It was supposedly done at least two days after the Watergate break-in, when E. Howard Hunt's ties were disclosed publicly—ties to the White House (where he had an office and had been paid as a consultant) and to the Watergate wiretappers (Hunt's name and White House telephone were listed in two of their address books). But court testimony by one DC police officer identified FBI agents on the Watergate scene by 2 pm on June 17, the afternoon of the break-in, some 14 hours after police first captured the five burglars. According to a deposition (in another court action) of White House aide Charles Colson (who hired Hunt for the White House and was a personal friend), the President's top domestic adviser John Ehrlichman was looking for Hunt in connection with the Watergate episode "late in the afternoon" of June 17. Watergate trial testimony showed the FBI was looking for Hunt at his office June 19.

Despite this apparent fast start in getting into the inquiry there are signs the bureau's effort then slowed down considerably in some areas. G. Gordon Liddy (another of the convicted wiretappers) was not approached by the bureau until June 28. Hugh Sloan, Jr., treasurer of the President's reelection finance committee, was not interviewed until July 17, three days after he resigned his treasurer's position. Finally Tom Gregory, the college student recruited by Hunt to spy on Muskie and McGovern headquarters was not interviewed by the FBI until December 21 (three months after the Watergate indictments), at which time, according to Gregory, "I felt he [the FBI agent] didn't know very much of what he was asking about."

Gray kept the White House informed of Watergate case developments as they occurred. Gray's spokesman, however, has refused to disclose how this was handled. (Gray had precedent. When, during the Johnson administration, the FBI investigated Johnson's former Senate aide Robert C. Baker, a weekly summary was prepared for the White House by Herbert Miller, then assistant attorney general in charge of the criminal division. In turn the FBI gave daily summaries of its reports on Baker to Miller.)

There are indications that not only the White House but Gray himself was displeased with the amount of information that has leaked to the press from the FBI Watergate investigation. Four key FBI officials associated with the direction of the inquiry have since been transferred, either out of Washington or, in the case of one, to another agency entirely. There has been more than one press article, such as one in *Newsweek*, which

speculated that "Gray knows too much (or too little)" about the Watergate investigation and the President is not about to let him face a bank of curious Democratic senators at a confirmation hearing until the Watergate scandal has been laid to rest permanently—and perhaps not even then."

Gray's political activities. The acting director has yet to be questioned publicly about his speechmaking two or three times a week during the presidential campaign. Though he sought to justify his appearances as routine travels to various local FBI headquarters, the surrogate campaigning that he in fact did suggests the political character of the man. One former FBI official has alleged that in at least two instances Gray was encouraged by memo to accept already outstanding invitations that fit into the pattern of surrogate speeches established by the White House. A Gray appointment would raise the question of another political use of the bureau—a request by White House aide Ehrlichman that was sent out to 14 FBI field offices for information to be used in presidential campaign speeches. Almost two months after the request was filled its existence became public. Gray, in a background interview with *The Washington Post*, placed the blame on Assistant Director Thomas Bishop, now retired. Bishop is said to have been given the White House request by Gray's personal aide David Kinley. (Gray was in Butte, Montana giving a speech) and to have cleared it with W. Mark Felt, Gray's top operating official. No one other than Bishop seems to have been rebuked.

Gray's public relations. From the outset of his selection for the bureau job, Gray has built his political fences by adroit use of public relations. A flurry of well-advertised moves—women agents, approving modification of the strict Hoover dress code, setting up an equal employment section—got him headlines. His back-grounding of newsmen on transfers of agents and FBI officials, however, backfired within the bureau. And the flattering articles (which placed Hoover in a lesser light) that have appeared in *Parade* magazine, a 14 million-circulation Sunday supplement, went down badly with bureau old-timers who knew that the father of Gray's young aide David D. Kinley was the president of the company publishing *Parade*.

The delay in naming any permanent successor to Hoover is having a disturbing effect on the bureau. Anti-Gray elements within the FBI talk more openly about his failings. Reporters for example are encouraged to look into the costs of Gray's campaign-time travels by private air force jet, accompanied by his wife. "They run almost \$500,000," one FBI official suggested recently, tying it to an economy cutback being applied to in-service bureau training. In short a closely run, necessary, investigative organization is beginning to fall apart while waiting for the President to make up his mind on his friend Gray or someone else.

July 24, 1972

In answer to your attached note, dissemination of intelligence and security data to the White House is another practice which simply grew like Topsey without any particular reference, so far as I am aware, to the legal basis for it. The practice seems largely an outgrowth of the confidence which successive Presidents laid in Mr. Hoover and in the resulting frequent conversations which he had with those Presidents on such matters.

This is not to say that there is not a legal basis for such dissemination. I think the contrary is true and that a strong case could be built for it. I understand that the Inspection Division now has a "Yellow Tag" on this matter of dissemination so I will go into the matter only briefly.

If I had to officially justify the dissemination of intelligence and security information to the White House I would take up at least the following points:

- (1) The President's directive of December 6, 1939, in which President Roosevelt directed the FBI to coordinate Western Hemisphere intelligence matters. The clear inference is that the President is to be kept advised and I think that is exactly what happened.
- (2) Since the issuance of the above directive we have tried to keep all branches of the military informed of any security information which comes to our attention from either domestic or foreign sources which might bear on their activities. The President as commander-in-chief of the armed forces would seem to be entitled to the same information.
- (3) The National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 495) and subsequent amendments created the National Security Council, presided over by the President or his designee. The function of that Council is "the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security...." People on the White House staff are on the National Security Council and the FBI is a member of the

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United States Intelligence Board which serves as advisor to the National Security Council. Here again it seems to be a clear inference that we should keep the White House informed on intelligence and security matters.

(4) The President of the United States is and always has been responsible for keeping the civil peace within the United States. He has had to act, by calling out the armed forces or otherwise, in a surprisingly large number of cases beginning with the Whiskey Rebellion which President George Washington put down by calling out the militia. If my memory serves me correctly, the great majority of Presidents have had to act on something of this kind and a study once showed something like 200 such incidents. Here again is ample reason for keeping the President informed of domestic security matters.

(5) The President also is responsible for foreign policy and again it would seem that any intelligence we obtain which bears on that subject should be sent to the White House.

All of the above are matters which the President necessarily acts more directly on his own initiative than is the case with the criminal law. I suppose the President may act on criminal law himself through the Attorney General, but his action is generally so well hidden that the whole subject of criminal law enforcement is really left to the Attorney General and to him alone. Thus there seems quite a reasonable distinction between a constant flow of advice to the White House on matters of criminal law on the one hand and on matters of domestic and foreign intelligence on the other.

D. J. Dalbey

*Gm 8/2
9:57P*

- 2 -


Greenberg/Gray-3488

740811-93



Jan & Feb of '70 b6
b7C

Introduced European
Common Market

Met with Mrs 
Thurs 9-12.72
11 to 11:33 AM




Our US Govt is
5 to 10 yrs. out of
date as far as
Europe is concerned

WE need a Legat at Brussels who speaks
Fr. & Ger.

London - Paris - Rome.

Brussels is a City state. It is capital
of Com. Mkt. - In Brussels we have
bush league Diplomacy.

Yet here in Brussels we are going to
see the making of Economic & money-
tary union.

One of most dangerous men in Europe is
 and he is in Belgium. b6
b7C
He is  of the 4th Trotskyite Inter-
nat'l. - resp. for kidnapping of 

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Fr., Swiss, & W. Ger. Govts. Have
not barred

Essential to have a top, brilliant man
in Brussels.

No American yet understands the
dynamic changes which have occurred
in Brussels.

I've NATO since its beginning -
we can't have a beatnik USA in
the Medit. countries - the SIXTH FLEET
was the model for the USA. What
we have done is a mistake. USA is
losing TENUE (FR.) = Appearance & Reputa-
ment. I see this thru the foreign
family life.

The Medit. is becoming a Red lake &
they have TENUE -

[redacted]

[redacted]

of NYC

[redacted]

of NYC

[redacted]

of NYC. There are my
best friends.

4/24/73 Exec's Conference.
5:00 to 4:35P

1. Terrorism. International or Domestic
Defn.

Ltr. of 9/25/71. — Presidential Directive
re international terrorism.

State report of 11/7/72. — politically inspired
international terrorism.

2. What was power of the Cabinet Committee

(a) Directive from President to Cabinet Ctee.

(b) Comply with policies, standards, and
procedures and guidelines prescribed by Cabinet Ctee

3. ~~State report of 11/7/72~~ When we asked for assistance from DJ -

DJ wrote "pursuant to Presidential Directive", "The
Cab. Ctee. has decided FBI will have primary jurisdiction
& overall resp. for direction of ops. when and if
such acts occur."

In State rpt of 11/7/72. Rogers said Ctee agreed.
Whenever Federal jurisdiction exists FBI will be resp. for
responding promptly to acts of international terrorism.
Should troops be nec. Presidential auth. will be ~~obtained~~
required.

EN

Greenberg/Gray-3492

Becky Walters - General acts of terrorism
92-539 - Stat. has been passed conferring jurisdiction
- Similar to Anti-Riot Laws
- I'm referring to acts of terrorism not falling
under 92-539.

President's Cabinet Ctee to Combat Terrorism / OK

But there are other areas.

Greenberg/Gray-3493

640811-28

Wed CW [redacted]
9-13-72 WMF [redacted]

1. Piro was starting from zero, he had nothing specific in mind.

2. State has picked up the ball both foreign & domestic.

3. We have interest in the domestic side & with the visiting Israelis.

4. What is our Federal response?

(a) Do we extend Fed. protection?

(b) Do we cooperate with local police?

(c)

(A) E. = Action

5. Official guests to recv. foreign protection

Greenberg/Gray-3494

Officer Guard / Diplomatic



SS




CP S

Vol. 2 Fed laws to
kill officer guests

Domestic violence

Domestic terrorism

Protective - Investigative



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

March 6, 1973

PERSONAL ATTENTION
MEMORANDUM 10-73

Mr. Bell	_____
Mr. Baker	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Cleveland	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Gebhardt	_____
Mr. Jenkins	_____
Mr. Marshall	_____
Mr. Miller, E.S.	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Mr. Thompson	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Kinley	_____
Mr. Armstrong	_____
Mr. Bowers	_____
Mr. Herington	_____
Mr. Herwig	_____
Mr. Mintz	_____
Mr. Neenan	_____

MEMORANDUM TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE

(A) CONTACTS WITH CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS -- In view of the expanding utilization of Title III installations against subjects involved in organized crime by other Federal agencies as well as state, county and local police departments, it is necessary to be most circumspect in contacting your informants. Telephonic contact with them at their homes or at their places of employment should in each instance be guarded to insure no disclosure is made of the informant's status and to avoid conversation that might be misinterpreted. This reminder should be brought to the attention of all Special Agent personnel immediately.

3/6/73

MEMORANDUM 10-73

(B) VOUCHER MATTER - USE OF CASH TO PROCURE DOMESTIC PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION SERVICES -- Effective March 1, 1973, all employees performing official travel will be required to use cash to procure transportation services, including excess baggage charges costing less than \$15.00 unless special circumstances exist which preclude the use of cash. Government Transportation Requests (GTRs) are to be used for transportation charges costing \$15.00 or more. Employees are to claim reimbursement of cash expenditures for transportation services on SF-1012 Travel Voucher. Receipts will not be required inasmuch as individual expenditures will be less than \$15.00. All employees who have occasion to perform official travel should be advised.

Appropriate manual changes will be forthcoming.

Greenberg/Gray-3496

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(C) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY MATTERS -- In order to preclude any misunderstandings regarding applicants for the FBI National Academy, when notification is received from the head of an agency that he wishes to withdraw the application of a candidate for the National Academy, you should acknowledge this withdrawal in writing.

3/6/73

MEMORANDUM 10-73

(D) SPECIAL AGENT RECRUITMENT PROGRAM -- You are advised the recent freeze on hiring has now been lifted and Special Agent appointments will now be offered for Classes convening after April 1, 1973. The Classes for the remainder of Fiscal Year 1973 have been rescheduled as follows.

<u>Class Dates</u>	<u>Number in Class</u>
April 9, 1973	33
April 16	33
April 30	34
May 7	33
May 14	33
May 21	34
June 18	25

Continue to place emphasis on law applicants, accounting applicants, female applicants, members of minority groups and other applicants who appear to have outstanding qualifications. I would like to stress, however, the absolute necessity for recommending only those applicants for the Special Agent position who meet the high standards of personal appearance, personality and maturity. Investigations must continue to be penetrative and exhaustive and should establish the applicant's leadership ability, physical fitness, aggressiveness and ability to meet the public.

3/6/73

MEMORANDUM 10-73

- 2 -

(E) COPYRIGHT MATTER -- SAC Letter 72-22, (B), dated 4/25/72, brought attention to the fact that as a result of the passage of Public Law 92-140, signed by the President 10-15-71, and providing for creation of a limited copyright for sound recordings (records or tapes), the Copyright Office, Arlington, Virginia, had advised the Alexandria Office that a time lag of 2 to 6 months existed at that time between receipt of a copyright application or a letter containing either notice of use or intention to use copyright material, and the actual preparation and indexing of a file card advising that same has been received.

The above time lag has become a source of difficulty in adequately handling on a timely basis the requests received by the Alexandria Office from other field offices. In addition, because of this time lag factor, many Agent man-hours are lost in handling repeat searches of the same titles.

In an attempt to overcome this situation which exists at the Copyright Office and to prevent unnecessary expenditure of Agent man-hours in making repeat searches of records, the following instructions are being instituted:

In the investigation of a Copyright Matter, the field office receiving the complaint should attempt to determine the actual producer of the bona fide version of the tape or recording involved and then set out a lead for the office covering the home office of that company to determine the copyright status of the sound recording. If a copyright is, in fact, held by that company, the company should be able to supply the copyright date and number from its company records. It should be noted that copyrights granted sound recordings are prefixed by the letter "N." Subsequently, verification could be made at the U. S. Copyright Office, Arlington, Virginia, by setting out a lead for the Alexandria Office. Additionally, since Public Law 92-140 provides as criteria for violation of the sound recordings section that "only those sound recordings fixed and published on or after 2-15-72, are eligible for registration," verification of the exact date the recording in question was fixed could be established from the home office of that company. A sound recording is "fixed" when the complete series of sounds constituting the work is first produced on a final master recording that is later reproduced in published copies.

3/6/73
MEMORANDUM 10-73

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Greenberg/Gray-3498

240811-28

Henceforth, it will be incumbent upon the office of origin in Copyright Matter cases to contact a reputable tape and record dealer in an effort to determine whether the allegedly illegal duplications are in fact duplications of recordings fixed after 2-15-72. Most record dealers have access to catalogs which provide basic information of this nature. Astute selection of recordings with prosecutive merit should be made to preclude investigative expenditure of Agent man-hours in the handling of leads.

Manual changes will follow.

3/6/73

MEMORANDUM 10-73

(F) DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS FURNITURE -- Bureau documents recently came into the possession of unauthorized persons apparently as a result of inadequate security in disposing of surplus furniture. In the future, when desks or other furniture that have held Bureau documents are declared surplus, the items should be thoroughly searched by both Agent and clerical personnel. Desks and other equipment should be first searched by an Agent when their use is discontinued. At the time property is declared surplus and transferred to another agency it should be searched by the property clerk, even though it has been locked and/or otherwise sealed in the interim between original search and disposal.

(Security page attached)

3/6/73

MEMORANDUM 10-73

- 4 -

(G) USE OF CHARACTERS ON BUREAU COMMUNICATIONS -- With increasing frequency, FBIHQ is receiving communications bearing improper or misleading characters. The Internal Security, Revolutionary Activity, Civil Unrest, and Extremist Matter characters are being used on communications reporting the activity of individuals and organizations that should not be classified as revolutionary, subversive or extremist. This particularly occurs in communications containing information on demonstrations or other types of protest activity sponsored by groups which do not have revolutionary or subversive backgrounds. Information relating to protests by legitimate organizations in pursuance of their constitutional rights should not carry an Internal Security, Revolutionary Activity or other character implying that the FBI considers the groups to be a threat to the internal security or of a revolutionary nature. Bearing in mind that the FBI has no interest in individuals and organizations involved in legitimate dissent, where it is deemed necessary to report on activities of such groups, communications should bear the character "Miscellaneous - Information Concerning" followed by the parenthetical insertion of the interested Bureau division or section (see Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4, Item 14, page 3).

The above instructions are not intended to relieve you of the obligation of being aware of activity scheduled to take place in your territory where the possibility of civil disorder may occur as a result of disruptive elements. This type of activity should be followed through public and established sources to develop any possible violations of Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 231, 2101, 2383 or 2384 or any other statutes over which the Bureau has investigative responsibility. In the event a potential for violence develops, the Bureau should be promptly advised. Any violation of Federal statutes should, of course, be submitted under appropriate caption.

This should be brought to the attention of supervisory and investigative personnel handling these matters to assure that current Bureau instructions are being followed.

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

3/6/73
MEMORANDUM 10-73

- 5 -

505 TCF

9-29-72

1. Cab. Cee. on Terrorism chaired by Sec. State.
2. Articulate D of FBI interest in countering domestic terrorist action
3. Don't be hesitant about claiming full Pres. support.

Greenberg/Gray-3501

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DATE 9/10/79 BY 6076 WCH/JSB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Cleveland *W*

DATE: 2-22-73

FROM : Mr. Engelstad

SUBJECT: "TEN MOST WANTED FUGITIVES" PROGRAM
ASSOCIATED PRESS ARTICLE APPEARING IN
"HARTFORD COURANT" ON FEBRUARY 18, 1973

Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Baker	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Cleveland	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Gebhardt	_____
Mr. Jenkins	_____
Mr. Marshall	_____
Mr. Miller, E.S.	_____
Mr. Purvis	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Kinley	_____
Mr. Armstrong	_____
Mr. Bowers	_____
Mr. Herington	_____
Ms. Herwig	_____
Mr. Mintz	_____
Mrs. Neenan	_____

An Associated Press article appearing in the "Hartford Courant" on Sunday, February 18, 1973, (attached) reported that more than half of the individuals on the "Top Ten" list are political revolutionaries and refer to them as "political fugitives." It pointed out that the list reached a high of 16 people in 1970, nine of them sought for such crimes as sabotage and terrorist acts. Mr. Gray noted "But what are the charges?; There are no political fugitives!; Specific crimes?; and Charged with?" Mr. Kinley in a note to Mr. Felt noted "Shouldn't Fug. Pub. Unit set them straight?"

This article was apparently prepared by Thomas Seppy, a reporter for Associated Press who covers the Justice Building and discussed the Bureau's "Top Ten" program with Inspector Jack E. Herington and SA [redacted] of the Special Investigative Division on February 14, 1973. At that time it was most emphatically pointed out to Seppy that the Bureau has no "political fugitives" and that all of the individuals in the "Top Ten" program have been charged with serious crimes. Additionally, he was furnished write-ups concerning each of the individuals on the "Top Ten" which write-ups include specific charges and prior criminal convictions.

The individuals which Seppy is apparently classifying as "political fugitives" are as follows: Leo Frederick Burt, David Sylvan Fine, and Dwight Alan Armstrong, all of whom have been charged with sabotage, destruction of Government property, and conspiracy in connection with the bombing of a University of Wisconsin building. Additionally, all three have been charged by a State Grand Jury with six felony counts, including first-degree murder. Also, Susan Edith Saxe and Katherine Ann Power who are charged in the murder of a Boston police officer following a bank robbery and theft of Government property from a National Guard Armory. They have also been charged with participating in another bank robbery in Philadelphia during which one of the robbers attempted to ignite a "Molotov cocktail." Also, Bernardine Rae Dohrn who has been charged

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Kinley - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Cleveland - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Herington - Enclosure

1 - Mr. Miller - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Engelstad - Enclosure

TBC:dmc (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

Greenberg/Gray-3502

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Mr. Engelstad to Mr. Cleveland Memo
RE: "TEN MOST WANTED FUGITIVES" PROGRAM

with Interstate Flight - mob action; antiriot law, bombing matter and unlawful possession or receipt of firearms. These charges include, among other things, conspiring to transport explosives in interstate commerce with intention to injure persons or destroy or damage buildings, including various police and military installations and lastly Cameron David Bishop, who was previously convicted of assault and battery and is presently being sought in connection with the dynamiting of power transmission towers in Colorado. Specifically, Bishop is charged with destruction of war utilities.

With reference to the nine individuals referred to as being sought for such crimes as sabotage and terrorist acts in 1970, it would appear that this nine is made up of the aforementioned seven, plus Angela Davis and Hubert Geroid "Rap" Brown, both of whom have been apprehended. Davis, of course, was being sought on murder and kidnaping charges in connection with the shoot-out at the Marin County Court House during which a Superior Court Judge was killed. Brown was being sought for arson, inciting to riot, and failure to appear, which charges resulted from events which occurred in Cambridge, Maryland, in July, 1967. Brown had also been charged with assaulting an FBI Agent and violating the Federal Firearms Act. It is noted that Brown has a criminal record dating back to 1963 and has since been charged with attempted homicide.

Thomas Seppy, who apparently prepared this article, covers the Justice Building and is in frequent contact with representatives of the Press Services Office. In view of the fact that Seppy has previously been ^{not} advised that the Bureau has no "political fugitives," it is believed that it would be desirable to pointedly take up this matter with him and engage him in an argument concerning it but it is believed that the most appropriate course of action would be for a representative of the Press Services Office to bring the erroneous references to "political fugitives" to Seppy's attention during one of his visits to the office. As a further example of the erroneous reporting, the article states that Karleton Lewis Armstrong was arrested in Canada on February 17, 1973, when in fact, Armstrong was arrested on February 16, 1972.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Seppy be advised in line with the above.

JH. WVC
WVC
TBC
832
7
WVC

b6
b7C

TBC:dmc 2-22-73

Engelstand to Cleveland "TEN MOST WANTED
FUGITIVES" PROGRAM
AP artcl aprng in "Hartford Courant" on 2-18 reportd
more than half of indivls on "Top Ten" "political fugitvs."
LPG notd "What are charges, are no political fugtvs,
specifc crms & Charged with?" Artcl preparad by Thomas
Seppy reportd for AP who cors Justc Building & discusd
program with Inspectr Herington & SA [REDACTED]. That time
emphaticly pointd out Seppy that Bu hs no "politicl
fugtvs" & al indivls on "Top Ten" hv bn chargd with sers
crimes. Belvd most aproprt course actn re artcl hv
reprstv set Seppy straight. REC: Seppy b advsd lin above.

FD-247
(REV. 3-27-55)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1971-443-709

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Greenberg/Gray-3504

DO-6 OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WMT:
Shouldn't Fug. Pub.
Don't set them straight?
WMT
3/21 3:25p.

7 ✓
MR. FELT ✓
MR. BAKER _____
MR. CALLAHAN _____
MR. CLEVELAND ✓
MR. CONRAD _____
MR. GEBHARDT _____
MR. JENKINS _____
MR. MARSHALL _____
MR. MILLER, E. S. ✓
MR. PURVIS _____
MR. SOYARS _____
MR. WALTERS _____
TELE. ROOM _____
MR. KINLEY _____
MR. ARMSTRONG _____
MR. BOWERS _____
MR. HERINGTON _____
MS. HERWIG _____
MR. MINTZ _____
MRS. NEENAN _____

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DATE 9/10/79 BY 6076 WCH/RSB

Greenberg/Gray-3505

00011-20

Monday, February 18, 1973 5:52 PM

FBI List Of Wanted Now at 10

WASHINGTON (AP) — The FBI's list of most wanted fugitives has leveled off at 10, with more than half of them political revolutionaries, and there is no indication it will be expanded in the near future.

But there is no reason why it couldn't, should the need arrive.

"We're not wedded to the number ten," said Jack E. Herington, the FBI spokesman. "We would like to keep it at 10. If it's necessary, we'll add names to the list."

The 23-year-old Ten Most Wanted Fugitives program first went over 10 in 1961 when hatchet-killer Richard Markette was put on the list. He was arrested the following day.

In late 1970, however, the FBI list reached a record high with 16 people, nine of them sought for such crimes as sabotage and terrorist acts.

The current list, which was reduced to 10 last summer, contains the names of seven so-called political revolutionaries.

Herington said that the political fugitives have caused the investigative agency some problems because they may have fled the country to a sanctuary where the U.S. has no jurisdiction, such as Algeria.

Another problem, he said, is that the political fugitive doesn't travel in the same circles as the traditional bank robber or murderer whose apprehension built the reputation of accomplishment for the FBI.

"They move in a different culture," he said. "The political fugitive does not move in the normal underground system. It makes it more difficult for us."

On Feb. 17, 1973, Karleton Lewis Armstrong, one of four men wanted in connection with a fatal bombing on the University of Wisconsin campus, was captured by Canadian police in Toronto.

Only one other person on the then-list of 12 was apprehended during the year—Byron J. Rice who had been charged with the murder of an armored car guard. He surrendered to FBI agents in Chicago last Aug. 1.

There have been 317 persons put on the most wanted fugitive list since its inception in 1950 and 295 have been apprehended. Twelve others, including two last year, were taken off because they either were believed dead or the charges were dropped against them.

The "process dismissed" action is the only way a person's name can be removed from the list once it is put on.

Acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray III, and J. Edgar Hoover before him, decides what fugitives are placed on the Top Ten list after receiving recommendations from the field.

Hoover personally ordered the list to be expanded in 1961 and 1970 because he thought it was of utmost importance that the fugitives be caught.

Asked about the criticism that the FBI puts the name of fugitives they are about to capture on the list, Herington replied that the charge was ridiculous.

"There hasn't been a single case like that," he said. "We don't get any extra points for a top 10 fugitive. If we can catch a fugitive, we'll catch him."

He said there have been quick arrests because the program works.

"The method has been effective because we have apprehended fugitives after he has been on the list for only 24 or 48 hours," he said. "But somebody may see his picture in the paper or on television and spot him on the street. That person will call the FBI and we are then able to move rapidly."

The newest addition to the Top Ten list is Mace Brown, a convicted hired assassin who participated in an escape from the District of Columbia jail last fall. He was put on last Oct. 20.

Charles Lee Herron, one of five men allegedly involved in the slaying of one police officer and the critical wounding of another in Nashville, Tenn., on Jan. 16, 1968, was placed on the list on Feb. 9, 1968, and has been on the longest.


The others are Benjamin H. Paddock, who escaped from a federal prison in Texas while serving a 20-year sentence; Cameron D. Bishop, charged with sabotage in the dynamiting of Colorado power transmission towers;

Also, Dwight A. Armstrong, Leo Burt and David Fine, all wanted in the University of Wisconsin bombing; Bernardine Dohrn, a self-described revolutionary Communist and leader of the Weatherman; and Susan E. Saxe and Katherine Ann Power, reputed members of a radical, revolutionary group dedicated to attacking the United States military system and undermining police powers.

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44-08 DATE 9/10/79 BY 6076 WWA/AB

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DATE 03-10-2009 BY 65179 dmh/baw/sbs



1. WFO — Mc Nemott ✓
2. IND — H.L.L. ✓
Purvis ✓
3. If Heed & Purvis request retirement, then
for Asst. Dir.
4. Alexandria — Brennan ?? OK
5. Atlanta (ASAC) — O'Keefe ✓ OK
6. DI — decker replacement — a top flight ASAC.
L Cregar ✓
7. St Louisville (ASAC)
8. Vacancy on Inspection —

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. E. S. Miller

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. Dalbey
DATE: 1/2/73

Felt _____
Baker _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gebhardt _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Purvis _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

FROM : T. J. Smith *TJS/ELZ*
SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR
HANDLING TERRORIST ATTACKS
BUDED: 1/22/73

1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Baker
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

(U) On 11/24/72 the Chicago Office instituted an emergency plan to neutralize what was reported to be a possible terrorist attack similar to the Lod Airport, Israel, massacre in May, 1972. This was based on information from a source that such an attack by Arab terrorists might occur. One of the two major Chicago airports was considered a logical target. The attack did not occur; however, Chicago responded in a very efficient manner and at our request a critique was prepared and furnished to the Bureau. It is attached herewith. *(e)*

(U) The critique showed excellent planning and execution. One hundred nineteen Agents were strategically deployed at O'Hare International Airport in about 50 minutes. An additional 20 Agents assembled at Midway Airport. And while the Agents and supervisors executed their assignments in an excellent fashion, the critique disclosed a very important weakness factor which, had the planned attack occurred, could have seriously affected the outcome to the extent that Agents' lives might have been lost. That weakness was the shortage of various items of equipment ranging from handie-talkie radios to body armor. For example, Chicago, according to the attached critique, has only nine suits of body armor which, in view of the use of 119 Agents to possibly face a band of determined terrorist assassins, should be viewed with alarm. There were insufficient personal radios to permit adequate communication between the numerous Agents stationed throughout the airport facility. Shotguns and gas grenades were in short supply. There were insufficient bullhorns and binoculars. In other words, the Chicago Office could not equip the large, fast-moving force of Agents required to respond to a major terrorist threat. *(e)*

Enclosures

CONTINUED -- OVER

TJS:bjr
(10)

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DATE 03-10-2009

6076 *WGA/DB*
CLASS. & EXT. BY *9/10/79*
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 *2.8*
DATE OF REVIEW *1/2/93*

240811-20

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Greenberg/Gray-3508

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DATE 03-10-2009

ENV. VI

Tues.
10-3-72 CW WMA & ESM

5⁰⁰P to 6⁰⁰P

1. Am. Jewish Ctr. — LP: do not think we should meet
with DJ & AGC. Let DJ
do alone, unless ordered to
the contrary. b6
b7C

2. WE have room in our quota to put a man into Brussels.

3. Brussels:

4. Livio:

5. OI) Executive Order: Carbon — Check Terrorist papers —

6. Scientists: NYFO & WFO. Agents have been used to do this
sort of thing & t.

7. one of the very top physicists in the world. He is
working with President's scientific advisor. Do not drop in
AG's lap. Go see Gen. Harg et.

Greenberg/Gray-3509

6076 WMA/AB
9/10/79

CLASS. & EXT. BY
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 10/3/92

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Greenberg/Gray-3510

62 - 118045 - 2122)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7c

8. ~~Customs~~ - pre examination of shipments.
[redacted] ltr.

(U)

~~Customs~~ permission. Meet with ~~Qaeda~~

Go with ~~Arabs~~

Gear up for the other & be prepared to do it.

(X)

9. Assassination, but no duplication.

Greenberg/Gray-3511

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Bill Soyars 1:19 PM

Director's Staff Group Paper.

1. Most. But close primarily resp. for long range planning.

2. Exec. Conf. approves the st

3. Have we done long range planning in the FBI

4. We need a Director's Staff Grp.
Should not see person to whom it report
Place it in Inspection Division.

Tom. Lister

Montague

Went into a profess. job.

Wasted time

Not Dir. has this responsibility.

John. Miller

FBI. Has a suggestion program.

Training Division.

Waste of manpower.

Joe Casper

I have a Planning & Research
Program in Tra Div.

B. H. Soyars

DSG can help DTD on problems.

Joe London

Would it confuse lines of auth.

Greenberg/Gray-3512

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Frank Winhart

Analysis in a given area
can be done by Insp. Staff on a survey basis

Joe Cooper

Conferences ought to be set up
with SRIC's; They can aid us - Consider as
an alternative

Joe Vonder

We do it but on selected
subjects

J.P.M.

Refer it for the time being -

B.H. Soyars

Select very intell., reasonably
young men

Exec. Dir. + 5 add'l people

Highly competent & the authority of

this group

J.P.M. -

Nothing was done from this selection

Ed Miller -

Not really this complicated

In DID, I have been doing the

Short & long range planning of the DW.

We in DID must have a mty
towards to success

I like the idea; Don't let the form

set up groups on each Div. to do

this. Get its own plan sep - Then subject
it to study across the bureau

240811-20

Then we turn it to the Executive Conf.

H.C. Rosen

We must recall that what we decide may turn to be most practical. SAC's should be consulted.

(1) Plug Gp within the Division & SAC's input.

Bill Sizars

You just can't devote a man full time in the Div to plug.

Bob Rosen

Joe Border

Argues for Gp. within Res. Div.

J.P.M.

I get the impression we were not doing a thing for the past few years. We have made magnificent strides. If we have a problem, let's get with it.

Dwight Dalling

It's a known fact that we get chased to ideas; an insider can be in a position to ask the tough questions. No one else can do this job now. Divisions are bound to old concepts & they ought to be subject to a penetrating inquiry from a group that is tough enough to ask the tough questions.

WMT suggestion program deals with
mechanics.

Buck Walters

Policy

Planning

Evaluation

Nick Callahan

How many functions are
subject to policy, planning, evaluation

JPM

Progr. Planning & Budget

Frank Waiter

We have the gaps in each division
to do the work.

Suggestion Committee

Streamlining Committee

a cut out Ctee.

Al Rosen

There are areas of agreement here.

1. Administration.

2. Personnel.

3. Investigative.

4. Long Range.

5. Inspection.

JPM

Conrad

There are many solutions.
I agree that policy & planning
have been neglected.
There is merit to Muller's modification.
Easy to suggest, hard to implement.

Charlie Bates

I'd like to see better direction
to the Steering Committee. I
think Field could improve with guidance.

WLP

Nick Callahan

Off. of Minority
Affairs

Each Division has an E & Emp. Opportunity
Off.

Applicant recruitment helps with this.

Agents and clerks are not to be placed
in the same office space.

JPM

I believe we should have two E & Emp.
Offs.

Walters

I know of no problems we have
with blacks.

Dalbey

FBI must create visible
tangible symbol of black concern.

JPM

Ministers complain they have no
place to go; they have been
kicked back.

TEB

It would be a gesture.
We need to recruit agents.

JPM

I see every colored
applicant.

Dalbey

We are not trying hard
enough to recruit.

Borden

We have blacks out.

2⁵⁵ PM

UNANIMOUS VOTE!

2⁴⁰ PM

Buckwalter

Director's Advisory Com.
Director's Consultant Grp.

EXEL.
CONF

GRP

J.P.M.

I don't feel we have to persuade
the other 15% who are against FBI.

— That's true of 15%

640811-20

Greenberg/Gray-3517

TEB If you sent out on the Chs
the letters, you will be blacked.

C Bates You will be criticized no
matter how you make it up.

Nick C Premature to consider
it; you are the Acting Director.
Demo Party is getting ready to set
up a Chs to inves. the FBI

JPM If we could do it - I'd be
for it. But I do think it would
^{back} Why do it in this partisan
election year?

No we want to draw FBI
into partisan politics.

TEB I favor individual consultation
as a next with them.

GET ME LIST OF
COMMITTEES.

I CONGR. CTEE

II PRIVATE CTEE (I) (II)

III PRESIDENTIAL CTEE (PRES.)

Greenberg/Gray-3519

DALBY

What's wrong with this -
Because a climate in this country,
people who have something to say
are going to say it about the FBI

Ed Miller

- Rather than setting up a
Cee, I'm coming to the point that it is
better for us to meet this head-on

DDK

Tossing the ball to Congress
would be disastrous -

Joe Casper

- Rec. LRG meet with certain
people.

CAG why don't I see Jordan, Lockard,
Mankin

JPM

- why not use IACP Cies-

Al Korn

JPM

- WE SHOULD NOT BE INVESTIGATING
THESE BLACK GROUPS -

328P

Reeds

CONRAD

- As a tax supported Agency to
serve the people the most we can do is to
please the majority. Our critics are
uninformed - destroyers - to serve our interest

640811-20

Hope to consider whether we alternate
our suspects by seeing these people.
Win over is not the objective.

3:32 PM Organized Crime. Bill Cleveland

Gov. will tell you org. crime is anything
which can be used to sell g. to give \$'s -

1700 Agents on Org. Crime matters - highest
in FBI history.

Things not in the paper:

We have suggestions from

NYFO -

Open us up; let us loose

All kinds of suggestions which are
administrative in nature.

We should release org. cr. S.A.'s
from the Admin. Shackles

JPM I believe we have been too restrictive on
the Org. Cr. Operation -

SAC & ASAC's approving certain things
in the field

LPB - put in writing the facts & I'll
go over it.

Basic criticism is that we don't
operate under the attys.

John - Was there the top centralized

Joe Caggs - Liaison with police is my job. I hear them talk. They always mumble about FBI lack of cooperation.

I feel we could do more as members of LEIU & more in State Org. Activities.

Somebody ought to represent FBI and IACP. One on Org. Crime.

John Logan - We ought to participate with IACP. W.C. ought to represent us.

Bill Cleveland - We receive every grant from LEAA -

Joe Casper - We ought to participate.

Bill C. - Joe C. does a fine job on IACP. I'd like to see specifics on.

Bill C. - There are more things we can be doing. There is intell. to be obtained. An indiv. case basis.

TEB - Why do we have so many investigations completed & so few prosecuted.

64-0811-23

4:15 P. Ed Miller — Domestic Intell. Div

One of our major problems

Ellis's paper is on point

What is FBI authority to do what it is doing?

Paper is defensive & negative

Close the gaps

Eliminate the restrictions

Our report does not present the national security picture

We should concede that our crimes and security fields are close questions

We should admit a major weakness

Failure of DQ & FBI to work out policy guidelines

FBI's responsibility

Are we too defensive

Too many self-serving

statements

We cannot prevent!

Ours is to investigate!

Neither Intra Agency Agreements or Executive Orders give us authority

What is the Constitutional power of the President in the Internal Security field? What is it?

Art. II, Sec. 1, Sec. 2

Our directives all deal with FBI coordinations

Subversive crimes

We have just assumed authority to
conduct Internal Security investigations.

Cr. Intell. does not have this power. They
have their investigations on crime.

We do not use two statutes as auth.
to get domestic intell.; we use the Esp. & Sed. Act.

We have ignored the Logan Act.
Dozens of persons (Prevents intercourse & communications
have violated with for. govt.)
this stat.

What is going to happen at the Convention?

V. USC 533

Will the Peace Council Act
(Law Suit)

WE NEED AN OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT IN THIS
COUNTRY

WE SAY WE HAVE BROAD STATUTORY BASES
THAT WE ARE NOT USING TO SUPPORT OUR
INVS. RATHER THAN CONSTITUTIONAL BASES.

Joe Casper - I've been involved in all these
investigations since 1941 under
various Acts & we have Statutory
authority.

DDK

From an operational standpoint would
you be doing anything different?

100-100000-100000

B.H. Erwin Clee
on getting at FBI files -

Greenberg/Gray-3525

Buck Walters Laying aside these considerations, has the FBI gone further than it should

Ed Miller: ADEX

Dwight Paltay Mordian } where are
Rabingst } the guidelines used
by the FBI to differ between the desirer &
the dangerous individual.

AL Rorson

Can you make one criterion of
one specific case example.

DD Agree with Ed M & with JPM

5:15 PM

Absence of clearly
delimited jurisdiction
Overzealous attitude

8:30 AM B.H. Cleveland Drug Abuse

1. Joint Paper by all Divs + Laboratory
& Tra Div.
2. Our role is just about right.
3. We have enough w/o taking on narcotics
4. OMB is considering transfer of BND to
FBI (as of 3 wks. ago)